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Abstract 
The question of why institutional changes would affect the vertical coherence of 
the European Union’s foreign policy is addressed in this thesis. In answering the 
research question propositions on why institutional changes would have an effect 
on state behaviour, thereby policy outcome, are derived from both the normative 
and the rational choice versions of institutionalism. The proposition: changes in the 
normative foundation of an institution stem from the normative institutionalism, 
whereas the proposition: changes in the hierarchical structure on coordination is 
derived from the rational choice institutionalism. These are in turn compared over 
time to the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly. In order to determine whether the vertical 
coherence has changed, data is collected on the session meetings were the EU 
delivered statements on agenda items without Member States giving national 
statements at the same meeting and on the same agenda items. The findings of the 
research are as following: during the time period of 1998-2008 there was an 
increased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy, whereas during 2008-2013 the 
vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy at the First Committee 
decreased.   
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1 Introduction 
The Constitutional Treaty provides for a number of important institutional changes 
designed to improve the coherence of the EU’s external action (European 
Commission, 2006). 
 
 
 
Whether or not institutional changes effect the EU as a multilateral actor is debated 
in the academic literature. On the one hand some scholars, such as Knud Erik 
Jörgensen and Ramses A Wessel (2011:201-285) argue that the effects of 
institutional changes in legal competences on the EU’s position and performance in 
other international institutions are ‘doubtful’ (2011:285). Moreover, Fraser 
Cameron argues that changes in the institutional structure and procedure introduced 
with the Amsterdam Treaty are not alone sufficient to “ensure a coherent foreign 
and security policy” (1998, 59-76). On the other hand, some scholars such as 
Thomas Risse (2010) stress that the inclusion of the High representative and the 
external action service in the Lisbon Treaty means that the European Union has 
“completed the foreign and security portfolio” and “now commands the whole 
range of institutional capabilities of a cohesive and strong foreign and security 
policy” (2010:38). Furthermore, Jolyon Howorth underlines that the institutional 
arrangements introduced with the Lisbon Treaty have effects “in taking the EU 
foreign policy and security policy forward“ (2010:457). Moreover, Dominic 
Tolksdorf (2013) argues that the establishment of the High Representative and an 
external action service with the Lisbon Treaty “changed the conduct of the EU 
foreign policy significantly” (2013:1). 
The discussion on whether or not institutions have an effect on states behavior, 
and thereby on policy outcomes, can be summarized is in the wording of John 
Petersen as ‘the debate that never ends’ (1998:7). Nevertheless, the assumption that 
institutional changes or reforms are necessary tools in order to improve the 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy seem to be widely emphasized. For instance, 
Javier Solana underlined that the ‘Reform Treaty will bring more coherence’ of EU 
external policy and increase its role as a global player (Council, 2007). Nonetheless 
why should we assume that institutional changes through Treaty reforms affect the 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy?   
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1.1 Aim and Research Question 
The aim of this thesis is twofold: a theoretical and an empirical aim. The theoretical 
aim is to derive and test possible propositions from normative institutionalism and 
rational choice institutionalism on why institutional changes would have an effect 
on state behavior and thereby policy outcomes. The empirical aim is to compare the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in an international organization. 
Following that line, the research question in this thesis is:  
 
Why would institutional changes affect the vertical coherence of the European 
Union’s foreign policy, especially in international organizations such as the 
UN? 
1.2 Terms and Definitions 
In the following section the terms institutional change, vertical coherence, EU 
foreign policy, and international organizations are defined in order to avoid 
ambiguity when referred to in this study as well as to enable the reader to follow 
the arguments and conclusions made. The definition of vertical coherence has been 
given a more detailed discussion as it make up a significant part of the research.    
1.2.1 Institutional Change 
Scholars address the definition of institutions differently. Whereas some scholars 
emphasize institutions as both formal and informal rules affecting the behavior of 
actor (Knight, 1992:xi), others understand institutions as the legislative process 
(Milner, 1993:18). Nevertheless, the definition of institutional change used in this 
study is defined by László Urbán who views institutional change as ‘the 
replacement of one set of rules, expectations, and behaviors with another’ 
(1997:239).  
1.2.2 Vertical Coherence 
The scholarly academic literature on EU emphasizes coherence as a precondition 
for achieving effective foreign policy outcomes (Koehler, 2010; Thomas, 2012), 
and for acting as well as speaking as one actor (Allen, 1998). Nevertheless, both 
scholars of political science and legal scholars define coherence in a multitude of 
ways, although legal scholarship is more or less united in drawing a distinction 
between the principles of coherence and consistency (Cremona, 2011; Blockmans 
– Laatsit, 2012). Nonetheless in EU legislation are the terms coherence and 
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consistency frequently used as interchangeably. Literature on coherence of EU 
foreign policy argues that this is a result of the translation of the Treaties into the 
Member States’ different languages. For example the French version refer to the 
term coherence, which has been turned into the English consistency - sometimes 
replaced by references to cohesion, whilst the German version refer to kohärenze 
(Gebhard, 2011:105; Hillion; 2008:12; Missiroli, 2001:182; Nuttall, 2005:93; 
Thomas, 2012:458; Tietje, 1997:211).  
There are conflicting views in the literature on whether the difference between 
coherence and consistency matter. On the one hand, Simon Nuttall (2005:93) argues 
that any attempt at distinguishing between them ‘risk ending up in linguistic 
pedantry’. For that reason, authors use coherence and consistency interchangeably 
(Olsen, 2008:160; Gaspers, 2011:19) or define coherence as others would define 
consistency (Portela – Orbie, 2014:64). On the other hand, some scholars consider 
a distinction between the terms an analytical necessity (Reynaert, 2012:207-208; 
Dave, 2011:18; Gephard, 2011:106; Portela – Raube 2009:3-4). In the latter, 
consistency is defined as the ‘absence of contradiction’ and involves compatibility, 
namely that the different EU policies do not legally contradict each other. 
Coherence in turn implies increased systemic synergy in the implementation of 
these policies, i.e. the ability to add value to Member States’ foreign policies by 
acting together, and thus involves positive links between policy areas (Missiroli, 
2001:182-184). Cristopher Hillion (2008) stresses the need to distinguish the notion 
of coherence from consistency, as the ‘latter is an essential but insufficient 
condition for achieving the former’ (2008:12). In other words, coherence is 
considered a ‘desirable plus’ while the notion of consistency is perceived as a 
‘minimum requirement’ (Missiroli, 2001:182). Consequently, scholars who 
advocate a distinction of the terms seem to define consistency as a precondition for 
coherence and therefore as interlinked. Accordingly, Hillion underlined that 
coherence is, aside from the absence of legal contradiction, about ‘added value’ and 
‘synergies’ (2008:17). 
Nonetheless, in line with the abovementioned discussion one might argue that 
no clear line can be drawn between the terms of consistency and coherence, rather 
as observed by Missiroli both terms underline the need for compatible policies with 
the aim of ensuring that EU acts unitary (2001:182). The distinction between the 
terms should thereby be viewed as a linguistic, instead of an analytical, dilemma. 
Even though Horst-Günter Krenzler and Henning C. Schneider suggest a definition 
of consistency in studying EU’s external activities, I would however argue that it is 
also applicable to coherence: ‘a behavior based on agreement among the Union and 
its Member States, where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit 
of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory foreign policy’ (1997:134).  
Regardless of definition the literature divide the notion of 
coherence/consistency into different contextual levels of EU external relations. Ben 
Tonra underlines that coherence, as a part of a policy condominium instead of a 
common policy, should be sought at several levels: ‘between the instruments and 
capabilities available within each pillar of the Union, between the pillars 
themselves, between Member States and Community activities, [and] between the 
Union and its international partners […]’ (2001:38). These four different conceptual 
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dimensions of coherence: internal; horizontal; vertical and external are also 
observed by Cameron Gerhard (2011:107-109). Nevertheless, other scholars simply 
divide the notion of coherence vertically and horizontally (Missiroli, 2001:5; Olsen, 
2008; Dave, 2011: 19-23). For the purpose of this research a distinction between 
the internal and horizontal dimensions as well as between the external and vertical 
dimensions of EU’s foreign policy seems irrelevant. Further, as thesis aims at 
studying the foreign policy coordination as well as cooperation between the Union’s 
institutions and Member States, rather than the external activities of the Union as a 
whole, it focuses on the so-called vertical coherence of the EU (Hillion, 2008:17).   
In sum, this research define vertical coherence as the consistency between 
Member States and EU’s action.  
1.2.3 European Union’s Foreign Policy 
In the literature, authors debate on the appropriate distinction between European 
foreign policy and EU foreign policy. In line with the abovementioned definition 
of vertical coherence, namely compatibility of the foreign policy between the 
Member States and the institutions of the Union, the definition of foreign policy 
refers to the intergovernmental coordination of national foreign policy within the 
EU. As observed by Peterson et. Al. “foreign policy refers to policies and actions 
in those areas that are normally in the remit of national foreign ministers and on 
which nearly all decisions are taken unanimously” (2010:290). Therefore is EU’s 
foreign policy used as an umbrella term for the national foreign policy of the 
Union’s Member States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, hereinafter 
also referred to as ‘the CFSP’. 
1.2.4 International Organization 
There are several different perceptions of the distinction as well as relationship 
between international institutions, regimes and organizations. In this study, 
institutional organizations will be defined according to Michel Virally’s definition, 
as “an association of States, established by agreement among its members and 
possessing a permanent system of a set of organs, whose task is to pursue objectives 
of common interests by means of co-operation among its members” (1981:51).1 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 For related definition see White (1997) 
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1.3 Theoretical Point of Departure  
The theoretical debate on the role of institutions has long occupied researchers. 
Scholars have either focused on the question of whether institutions matter or not, 
or on how institutions matter. In connection with the former question, Robert O. 
Keohane and Lise Martin (1995) argue in The Promise of Institutionalist Theory 
that institutions constitute an ‘important determinant’ to state behavior, and thereby 
replying to John Mearsheimer’s article The False Promise of International 
Institutions (1995) within which he argues that institutions do not have any effect 
on state behavior. The theoretical literature on how institutions matter encompasses 
several approaches to institutionalism. In Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996) identify three main forms 
of institutionalism: sociological; rational choice; and historical. Furthermore, in 
Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism Peters P. Guy 
(1999; 2005; 2012) identifies seven types of institutionalism: normative; historical; 
rational choice; empirical; sociological; interest representation; and international 
institutions. In addition, Vivien Schmidt (2008; 2010) emphasizes a discursive 
version of institutionalism that includes the ‘substantive dimension of ideas and 
discourse’ (2010:3). Regardless of terminology, the basic assumption of 
institutionalism is that institutions affect the behavior of political actors, or at the 
international level states, and thereby the policy outcome. 
1.3.1 Differences between the Versions of Institutionalism  
As outlined above, the literature of institutionalism emphasizes a variety of versions 
and thereby in following sub-section the differences between them are discussed. 
The so-called empirical version of institutionalism emphasizes empirical research 
on the impacts of structures on action and thereby ought to rather be of 
methodological rather than theoretical concern. Furthermore, interest representative 
institutionalism2 emphasizes how actors, others than states and individual actors, 
interact to form structural arrangements among themselves, and thereby constitute 
an institution. Moreover, international institutionalism encompasses the link 
between international relations and political science literature on institutions 
(Peters, 2012; 87-105, 123-154). However, a lack of clarification by Peters for why 
these versions should be treated separately from other versions of institutionalism 
leads us to argue that they do not constitute a theoretical source for the purpose of 
this research.  
Although the normative, sociological and discursive versions of institutionalism 
are portrayed as separated from each other, they do demonstrate more similarities 
than differences. As regards similarities, they have the same view on what 
mechanisms institutions may provide which and how these mechanisms affect state 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 By Christopher Ansell (2009) termed ‘network institutionalism’.  
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behavior. Furthermore, they all assume that ideas are exchanged and conveyed 
through a process of socialization (March – Olsen 1989:22) – by Schmidt called ‘an 
interactive process’ (2010:3). Accordingly, one might argue that normative, 
sociological and discursive institutionalism all derive from the theoretical 
assumption on the role of institutions by James March and Johan Olsen (1984; 
1986; 1989; 1998; 2006), which some scholars have categorized as ‘normative’ 
institutionalism. ‘Normative’ refers to a concern with norms and values as 
explanatory variables, and not to normative theory in the sense of promoting 
particular norms and values (Peters 2012; Tallberg – Jönsson 2008; Thoenig 2003; 
Thomas 2009). The difference lies in which factors they emphasize as the 
underlying sources for institutional change. However, the question of which 
versions of new institutionalism may generate explanatory factors for why 
institutions change or not, is debated (see for instance Hira – Hira 2000; Peters 
2012) and of little importance when addressing the question of how institutional 
change affect vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy.  
The literature on institutionalism argues that the historical version encompasses 
both a rational choice argument of actors as calculators and a normative cognitive-
cultural perspective on the relationship between institutions and actors (Lowndes 
2002:96). The historical institutionalism literature emphasizes ‘path-dependency’ 
in order to explain institutional stability and calls attention to so-called ‘critical 
junctures’ to explain changes. These junctures, characterized by a situation in which 
constraints on action are eased for a short period, may then constitute the starting 
point for path-dependency processes (Capoccia – Kelemen, 2007:341-343; Steinmo 
et.al, 1992). Accordingly, historical institutionalism is more concerned with the role 
of ideas to explain institutional ‘reproduction’ rather than using ideas to understand 
change after the initial formation of an institution (Hay, 2006). The literature on 
historical institutionalism has therefore been criticized for not specifying or 
developing an understanding of how institutions, or even institutional changes, may 
affect the behavior of actors (Peters, 2012:83). While Peter Hall (2010) argues that 
the historical version of institutionalism offers analytical solutions to explain when 
and how institutions change, we argue that as a result of its limit to analytical 
address the question of how institutions affect actors’ behavior historical 
institutionalism per se is not applied in this research.  
The rational choice version of institutionalism consists of scholars from both 
political science and international relations (Pollack, 2007:33-34). The ‘normative’ 
and ‘rational choice’ versions of institutionalism have the most varying perceptions 
on what mechanisms institutions may provide and how these affect state behavior. 
On the one hand, a rational choice approach associates institutions as formal 
structures and rules of the ‘political game’ which affect the strategic and calculated 
state. On the other hand, a normative approach define institutions as informal and 
formal rules of appropriate behavior. In contrast to the historical approach, both 
rational choice and normative versions tend to focus on the process and outcome 
rather than the origins of institutional change (Mabee, 2011:28). Moreover, while a 
rational choice approach emphasizes state preferences prior to institutions, 
normative institutionalism view preferences as shaped by institutions. As observed 
by Vivien Lowndes (2002:106) the ‘normative’ and ‘rational choice’ versions of 
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institutionalism “are built upon different theoretical assumptions about the impact 
of institutions on political behavior, and about the interaction between individual 
actors and institutions.” Consequently, we should assume that one might derive 
different mechanisms for institutional changes, and for the theoretical aim of this 
research the rational choice and normative versions of institutionalism will be 
applied.  
1.3.2 Normative vs. Rational Choice Institutionalism: Compatible or 
Competitive  
Normative and rational choice institutionalism are basically understood as two 
competing theories on the relationship between institutions and action (Knight, 
1992: 14). As outlined above, a rational choice version of institutionalism 
emphasize actors’ preferences as exogenous and institutional factors as 
endogenous, while a normative version of institutionalism in turn argues that actors’ 
preferences are shaped by institutions (Aspinwall – Schneider 2000:10), The main 
dispute between the versions is whether or not the logic of consequence exceed the 
logic of appropriateness (see for instance Krasner). Nevertheless, to distinguish the 
exact circumstances in which one motivation predominates is beyond the scope of 
this research. In line with Goodin and Lingeman who argued that “it is a matter of 
analyzing behavior within the parameters set by institutional facts and opportunity 
structures” (1996:10-11), it is reasonable to assume that both norm and rational 
calculation motivate action, thereby affect state behavior. 
In the literature on rational choice institutionalism, scholars recognizes that 
institutional constraints also can be informal, as such inclusion of norms and values 
in individual preferences can explain behavior (Eggertsson, 1996:19). 
Nevertheless, these informal constraints are recognized as underlying formal 
constrains (North, 1990:36-53). Although, some scholars argue that rational choice 
institutionalism therefore encompasses both logics of action (see for instance 
Kahler, 1998), we argue that normative and rational choice institutionalism define 
institutions differently and should therefore be treated separately. As observed by 
Snidal (2013:88) ‘the elastic of the rationality concept makes it tempting […] to 
reduce alternative conceptions to a form of goal seeking. Treating 
“appropriateness” as an element of utility function simply miss the difference 
between the approaches, which needs to be taken more seriously’.  
Moreover, a rational choice version of institutionalism focuses on short-term 
effects of institutions whereas a normative variant emphasizes the long term effects. 
Even though the issue of time may be of marginal importance when addressing the 
question of how one would assume that it is of greater importance when addressing 
the question of why institutional change affect state behavior. For the purpose of 
this research, the rational choice and normative version of institutionalism is to be 
viewed as complementary.  
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1.4 Research Contribution 
This subsection review existing theoretical and empirical literature in order to 
emphasize the theoretical as well as empirical contribution of this research.   
1.4.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Scholars of institutionalism emphasizes that institutions change and seek to include 
institutional change as an important variable to be studied (March – Olsen, 1984; 
1989:49; North, 1990; Keohane – Nye, 2012). Nonetheless, scholars of 
institutionalism have rather focused on the connection between institutions and 
action in order to explain stability (Mahoney – Thelen, 2010: 6-7). For instance, in 
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change edited by 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993) scholars address ideas within a 
rationalist framework and underline that institutionalization of ideas affect political 
behavior and thereby stabilizes institutions. Moreover, one might assume that the 
scholars of institutionalism, as a reaction towards ‘doubters’, rather have stressed 
explanations as to why institutions have an effect on state behavior, and thereby 
focused on explaining continuity and stabilization instead of change (Guy Peters, 
2012). For instance, Daniel C. Thomas (2009a; 2009b) has derived the explanatory 
factor ‘entrapment’ from normative institutionalism in order to explain why 
Member States of the EU act collectively on matters of foreign policy.  
Furthermore, in theorizing on institutional change scholars of institutionalism 
rather address the question of why institutions change (see for instance Alston et 
Al. 1996 and Douglass North, 1990). Nonetheless, scholars of institutionalism 
implicitly encompass assumptions on the effects of institutions. For instance, Nils 
Brunsson and Johan Olson (1997) emphasize the effects of reorganizations on 
institutions, thereby the behavior of actors, as either leading to changes or 
stabilization. This as a consequence of their argument that reforms may both 
prevent change as well as contribute to stability (1997:199-200). Therefore, this 
thesis theoretical contribution is to search for possible explanations from the 
normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism to why we should expect 
institutional changes to have an effect on state’s action, and thereby policy 
outcomes.  
1.4.2 Empirical Contribution 
The existing empirical literature on the effects of institutional changes on the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in institutional organizations are limited. 
Rather in studying the institutional changes, particularly after the establishment of 
the Lisbon Treaty, scholars have mainly focused on its effects on the EU as an 
efficient multilateral actor in international organizations.  For instance, in their book 
chapter the position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
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confronting legal and political approaches (2011:201-285) Knud Erik Jörgensen 
and Ramses A. Wessels conduct an analysis on the effects of institutional changes 
on the correlation between legal institutional competences and the position of the 
EU in another international institution. Furthermore, in their book chapter The EU 
as a multilateral security actor after Lisbon: Constitutional and institutional 
aspects Jan Wouters, Stephenie Bijmakers and Katrien Meuwissen (2013: 72-103) 
studied the institutional changes with the Lisbon Treaty on the coherence of EU’s 
common foreign and security policy. This was done in order to assess whether the 
changes enhanced the EU’s capacity as a ‘multilateral security actor’. Nevertheless, 
the findings in connection with the coherence of the Union’s foreign policy are 
based on a legal approach, meaning that the effects were determined by the change 
of Treaty provisions.  
In the same line, Steven Blockmans and Marja-Liisa Laatsit (2012) analyze 
whether the creation of an external action service has enhanced the inter-
institutional coherence of EU’s external actions by underlining the widening of its 
legal mandate as stipulated in the Treaties provisions. Moreover, in article 
European foreign policy after Lisbon: strengthening the EU as an international 
actor (2010) Kateryna Kohler study the effects of institutional changes on the 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy by analyzing the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Nevertheless, in order to assess the institutional changes introduced by the Treaties, 
Madeleine Holsti et. Al. (2010) studied the voting cohesion of the EU at the General 
Assembly over time. Furthermore, Xi Jin and Madeleine Holsti (2011) analyzed the 
effects of institutional changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty on the voting 
behavior of EU’s Member States at the United Nations General Assembly. In sum, 
it seems to be an empirical gap in the literature as studies have either focused on 
the legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty, in order to determine its effects on the 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy, or on voting cohesion. Therefore, the empirical 
contribution of this thesis is to ‘fill’ this gap by studying the effects of institutional 
changes on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international 
organizations. 
1.5 Outline 
The following section will start with presenting the normative version of 
institutionalism, which will be followed by a section on the rational choice version 
of institutionalism. These theoretical sections will emphasize institutionalism 
arguments for why institutional changes would affect states behavior. Thereafter is 
the methodological motivations and choices made in order to answer the research 
question. In the following section we will emphasize the institutional changes with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty which according to the theoretical 
approaches are important factors for institutional changes to have an effect on states 
behavior, and thus the policy outcome. In the sections thereafter a study on the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at First Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly according to the theoretical approaches are conducted. The 
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findings in the research will be summarized in a concluding section. In the 
concluding section the research question will be answered and suggestions for 
further research is made.        
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2 ‘Normative’ Institutionalism   
The following section encompasses the normative institutionalism 
conceptualization of institutions and how its changes effects state behavior. This 
section therefore begins with a definition of institutions and how they change. 
Subsequently the section addresses why institutions according to the normative 
version of institutionalism changes.   
2.1 Institutional Change – A Learning Process 
Normative institutionalism conceptualizes institutions as a collection of normative 
values and rules which are means for determining the political behavior of actors. 
Routines are also embedded in the conception of institutions, as they are developed 
in order to implement and enforce rules. March and Olsen emphasizes the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ as a means for shaping and constraining the behavior of members 
of the institution (1984; 1989; 2009). Accordingly, actors are driven by appropriate 
rules, which in turn are organized into institutions. These actors are by Keohane 
and Martin (1995) referred to as states, while March and Olsen refer to them as 
‘human’ or ‘political’ actors. Rules of appropriateness are seen as carries of lessons 
from experience and are developing as a result of experience with a specific 
situation over time (March – Olsen, 2009:1-22). A normative institutional approach 
is, therefore, rather concerned with institutional development than change per se 
(Peters, 2008:8; Olsen, 2008:29). In other words, institutions develop and adapts to 
changes in a process of learning and selection. Nevertheless, the literature on 
normative institutionalism points to several stimuli for change in addressing the 
question of which factors of change that may cause developments in the learning 
process and, thus changes of institutions (Hira – Hira, 2000; Peters, 2012:36). 
Guy Peters (2008:8-11) argues that in order to study development within an 
institutions one need to take two types of change into consideration: internal 
development of institutionalization; and type of change in values and/ or structures 
that are assumed to characterize the institutions. The first type of change considers 
the long term process of institutions to become institutions, the so-called learning 
process. Even though Peters’ two types of change are addressed by the literature on 
normative institutionalism, one might argue that it is difficult from a normative 
institutionalist perspective to draw a line between them. As March and Olsen 
(1989:40) emphasize “[…] values and preferences of political actors are not 
exogenous to political institutions but develop within those institutions”. 
Accordingly, the internal development of institutionalization is rather a part of the 
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changes of values and structures as well as the types of changes of values and 
structures are a part of the internal development of institutionalization.  
The development of institutions depends on both the current environment and 
political condition as well as on the institution’s history and internal dynamics. 
Institutional outcomes are therefore determined by external pressures and internal 
conditions (March – Olsen, 1998:15). Nevertheless, normative institutionalism 
view history as inefficient and, as such, portrays the link between political 
institutions and their environment as less automatic. In other words institutional 
development may occur under circumstances of inconsistency with their 
environment or even collapse without any external cause (March – Olsen, 1989:16). 
At the same time, actors may shortly change their behavior as a consequence of 
radical environmental changes, stemming from reforms or fast fluctuating 
circumstances3, but rules and standard operating procedures change gradually over 
a long period of time and during fairly stable environments (Brunsson – Olsen, 
1997:11). Consequently, we cannot see the process of adaptation as mechanisms 
for matching appropriate institutions with exogenously created environments 
(March – Olsen, 1989:46). 
2.2 The Effects of Administrative Reforms  
The literature on the normative version of institutionalism conceptualizes 
administrative reforms as attempts at changing organizational forms. The 
assumption is that reforms tries to change organizations by ‘intervening’ in existing 
structures and processes. Although scholars of normative institutionalism do not 
address the nature of this intervention, they further argue that reforms attempt to 
intervene in organizational structures and processes in order to improve an 
organization’s results (Olsen – Peters, 1996:5; Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:1; March – 
Olsen, 19894). By consulting the literature of these scholars, we might point the 
effects of administrative reforms on the behavior of political actors. March and 
Olsen (1989:86-89, 94-95) recognizes that administrative reforms and major 
reorganization projects can lead to structural changes of the organization, but argues 
that they do not directly affect the behavior of members of the institution. In other 
words, as stated above, administrative reforms can affect the behavior of actors 
shortly after its establishment as it causes environmental changes but does not 
change the normative foundation of institutions. 
Therefore, changes in administrative structures or procedures can be seen as 
challenging elements of the core system of meaning, belief, interpretation, status 
and alliances in politics (March and Olsen, 1989:112). Moreover, as carriers of 
social values, organizations can function as creators of meaning and identities 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 A condition which in the literature on historical institutionalism entitled ‘critical junctures’ (see for instance 
Collier, Paul – Collier David. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and 
Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.)  
4 Note that March and Olsen (1989) refer to this conceptualization as ’administrative reorganization’.   
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through which a political discourse and frequent interactions between actors can 
become a part of actors’ belief (Olsen – Peters, 1995:8). Accordingly, 
reorganizations are viewed as expressions of social values and can potentially 
transform both agendas and goals through repetition of similar ideas and arguments 
over a long period of time. In The Reforming Organization Brunsson and Olsen 
(1997) specifically address the question of reforms in organizations and emphasize 
that development of institutions is less a matter of structural reforms, such as 
legislation, and more one of changes of norms and world views. Therefore, when 
the environment is institutionalized the primary effect of attempted reforms may be 
in the creation of meaning. In that regard, development of meaning becomes a more 
significant aspect of the reform process than the structural changes achieved. 
Consequently a reform effort may set off, or rather become a part of, a long term 
process of change in the normative foundation of institutions (Brunsson – Olsen, 
1997:11-12). 
2.3 Changing Normative Foundations 
A normative version of institutionalism emphasizes that institutions create an 
interpretative order through the structure of meaning. Within this interpretative 
order actors’ values, beliefs and identities are shaped, and thereby their behavior 
(March – Olsen, 1989:17). Nonetheless, in connection with the argument that 
organizations encompass social values normative institutionalism underline that the 
construction of meaning is intertwined with organizational intentions and actions, 
‘as meaning is constructed in the context of becoming committed to action’ 
(Brunsson – Olson, 1997:11-12). Consequently, organizations and reorganizations 
are tied to the discovery, clarification and elaboration of meaning. The literature on 
the normative version of institutionalism conceptualize the structure of meaning as 
a cluster of beliefs and norms which characterizes institutions (March – Olsen, 
1989:39-52; 1998). Therefore, we should assume that changes in the normative 
foundation of an institution affect the behavior of states, as preferences are shaped 
by institutions, and thereby the policy outcome. 
The structure of meaning is part of the process by which a society develops an 
understanding of what constitutes a ‘good’ society, without necessarily being able 
to achieving it. As March and Olsen argue “[…] Institutions create their own 
environments by the way they interpret and act in a confusing world. It is not simply 
that the world is incompletely or inaccurately perceived, but also that actions taken 
as a result of beliefs about and environment can, in fact, construct the environment” 
(1989:47). Nevertheless, as individuals and institutions seek to achieve some kind 
of cognitive consistency, beliefs are linked with preexisting values and cognitions. 
Understandings of events and their value are therefore connected to previous 
experiences and social linkages. However, values and beliefs become 
institutionalized through the development of meaning and thereby, political actors 
discover and construct their meaning through the process of acting on them (March 
– Olsen, 1989:46).  
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March and Olsen and their associates also emphasizes the question of what may 
affect the creation of meaning by arguing that reorganization and administrative 
reforms are domains of rhetoric and symbolic action. In connection with the latter, 
a normative version of institutionalism underlines that redefinition of the tasks, the 
objectives and the performance of an organization can be brought about by rational 
discourse and political rhetoric, involving arguments and the development of ideas. 
Political discourses and continuing rhetoric about the concerned reform is assumed 
to affect actors’ beliefs, values and world view, thereby affecting nature of 
existence (March – Olsen, 1989:47-48; Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:11).  
Nevertheless, normative institutionalism emphasizes that world view and norms 
also can be changed in a process involving slogans and symbols which establishes 
shared conceptions of experience. Symbols, rituals and ceremonies therefore 
provides actors with an interpretation about the world. Nonetheless, Brunsson and 
Olsen (1997:4-5) argue that changes does not necessarily leads to expected changes 
in actors behavior. For instance, if a reform attempts at changing an organizations 
established institutional identity which ‘violate’ with the existing values and beliefs 
actors’ behavior may either be stabilized or inconsistent. Furthermore, changes in 
line with the established values and beliefs of the institution are “carried out as a 
matter of routine”. These changes may then rather contribute to stabilized state 
behavior, but if continued small changes are made in the same direction, they may 
lead to changes in the foundation of the institution and thereby the state behavior 
(Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:199-200).   
Rhetoric and symbols thereby enable gathering and processing information are 
driven by a lack of clarity about how to talk about the world, whereby symbols and 
political rhetoric enable actors to develop an understanding of what constitutes a 
‘good’ society through a gradual socialization into a culture of shared principles 
and standards (March – Olsen, 1989:48; Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:11-12). When 
reform aim at changing administrative culture, concepts of meaning, norms, 
identities, the resources necessary to mobilize support and commitment for change 
among civil servants and others directly affected appear to be considerably larger 
(March and Olsen, 1989:110). Nonetheless, the normative version of 
institutionalism emphasizes that reforms aiming at changing administrative culture, 
concepts of meaning, norms, and identities is time consuming and requires 
commitment for change by actors directly affected by it (March and Olsen, 
1989:110).  
In sum, the structure of meaning can then be viewed as the normative foundation 
of institutions within the beliefs, values and identities is shaped. This normative 
foundation in turn affect the rules of appropriates, and thereby the behavior of actors 
as its preferences is shaped by the institution. Therefore we should from a normative 
version of institutional expect that changes, or at least developments, in the 
normative foundation of an institution affect state behavior, by changing 
organizational symbols and frequent political rhetoric about them.     
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3 Rational Choice Institutionalism    
The following section begins with a definition of institutions from a rational choice 
perspective. Followed is a discussion from a rational choice version of 
institutionalism on the structural constrains imposed by institutions and which are 
expected to have an effect on actors behavior. These structural constrains are than 
addressed in the section on ‘changing structure for strategic choices’.   
3.1 Institutions Structure Strategic Interactions 
The rational choice perspective derives from neo-classic economics and view 
actors, or at the international level states, as utility-maximizers which rank priorities 
in accordance with their fixed set of preferences. In determining their action, actors 
as utility- maximizers are therefore expected to calculate the utility of alternative 
courses of action and are assumed to maximize their preferences through strategic 
calculations. Moreover, their calculations are affected by the actor’s expectations 
about the actions of others (Ward, 2002:66-71). Accordingly, the rational choice 
version of institutionalism emphasizes that strategic interaction is an important 
factor the determination of political outcomes (Pollack, 2009:125-127).  
Nevertheless, uncertainty for rational actors about the actions of others are 
likely to lead to a suboptimal outcome. In other words, another outcome could be 
found that would make at least one of the actors better off without making any of 
the others worse off. This can also be defined as instances when rational actors 
interact with others in a context requiring cooperation and coordination in the 
pursuit of mutual advantage. Hence, without institutional arrangements the actors 
may establish collectively suboptimal outcomes, as actors seek to maximize their 
own preferences. Consequently, means of resolving the uncertainty of the action of 
other actors is important in order for strategic action to reach an equilibrium, which 
would enable rational actors to assess the outcomes associated with their choice of 
strategies (Knight, 1992:48-54; Snidal, 2913:87).  
Notably, rational choice institutionalism emphasizes that the problem of 
uncertainty can be reduced through institutions (Knight, 1992:53). Institutions are 
defined as sets of rules “created by human action and structuring that action” 
(Keohane, 2002:15), or as emphasized by Douglas North (1981:3) “the rules of the 
game in a society”. Scholars of a rational choice perspective underline that 
institutions are constructed by the utility-maximizing states in order to coordinate 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Also observed by Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfenning (2009:68) who argues that ‘international 
institutions is […] a collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices.’ 
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their action and thereby reach collective beneficial outcomes. Moreover, according 
to the rational choice version of institutionalism, institutions themselves constitutes 
equilibria and serve as constrains for actors in a ‘game’ to achieve collective 
benefited outcomes (Snidal, 2013:88).  
The institutions resolve the problem of uncertainty by providing information 
about the strategies of other actors. In that regard, scholars of rational choice 
institutionalism emphasize institutions as providing a set of formal constrains, in 
terms of political and judicial rules. These formal rules provide information about 
how actors are expected to act and structure the strategic choices of actors in such 
a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes (Knight, 1992:54). Furthermore, 
institutions might structure the strategic choices of actors by providing information 
about the choices and behavior of other actors; by affecting the range of alternative 
choices; and by providing enforcement mechanism (Shepsle, 1989; Tallberg, 
2006:16). Nonetheless, in connection with the enforcement mechanism rational 
choice institutionalism argues that as the benefits of complying with agreements 
exceeds the costs, actors constrain themselves in order to constrain the action of 
others. This can from a rational choice version of institutionalism be explained as a 
condition under which states engage with institutions in order to reduce the 
uncertainty about others strategies as well as to affect future expectations of others 
actors. In doing so, an actor need to commit to a future course of action within the 
institution and thereby enforcing the formal rules on themselves (North, 1990:54-
60; Knight, 1992:64-65). Information and enforcement are therefore assumed to 
reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behavior of others and to “allow gains 
from exchange” (Hall – Taylor 1996:12).   
3.2 Changing Structure for Strategic Choices  
As outlined above, rational choice institutionalism emphasizes institutions as a 
result of state action and thereby is it assumed that institutions change in terms of 
supply and demand. In other words, institutions will change when it lies in the 
interest of actors to do so (Alston, 1996:26-28). Furthermore, Keohane (1989:10) 
underlines that changes in processes, as a result of institutional changes, “can exert 
profound effects on state behavior” (1989:10). Hence, in line with a rational choice 
definition of institutions we should expect that changes of institutions, meaning 
formal rules, affect the structure of a situation in which actors select strategies for 
the utilization of their preferences. Moreover, in accordance with the rational choice 
institutionalism argument that actors themselves formalize institutional changes, 
we should expect actors to act in accordance with these. Therefore, we should in 
turn discuss what kind of changes in the structure of strategic choices that could 
affect state behavior and, thereby collective outcomes.   
According to a rational choice institutionalism perspective the function of rules 
is to facilitate exchange of information between actors for collective beneficial 
outcomes, we should emphasize arrangement aiming at resolving situations 
requiring collective choices. In that regard, by viewing co-ordination as “the 
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creation of a common order for a number of separate elements” (Ekengren – 
Sundelius, 2004:112) through a process involving shared activity we emphasize 
structures of co-ordination as an important element for changing the structures of 
strategic choices. In doing so, we start by identifying possible co-ordination 
structures affecting state behavior.  
As observed by, Knight (1992:172) Elinor Orstrom (1990) provides with an 
inspiring three-level typology of interlinked institutional rules. The ‘lowest’ level 
of rules are operational formal rules governing the everyday activities, next level 
constitutes rules governing the process by which policy decisions are made; and 
lastly, the ‘upper-level’ rules affect the daily activities and results, and determine 
the specific rules to be used in crafting set of collective-rules that in turn affect the 
set of operational rules. Furthermore, by encompassing Douglas North’s (1990:47) 
distinction of hierarchical and decision structures one might argue that instead of 
dividing institutional rules into three levels of analysis it rather contains two levels. 
While the two ‘lower’ levels: operational and collective, together constitute the 
basic decision structure; the ‘upper-level’ include the hierarchical decision structure 
of the policy. From these two levels one might then derive two dimensions of 
structures.  
In connection with the former level, a state needs to follow decision-making 
structures and rules depending on the policy area addressed. For instance, policies 
which require decision-making on a consensus basis and necessitate states to co-
ordinate their preferences with another. In order for states to coordinate their 
strategies they need to share information about each other’s strategies and 
preferences attached to different courses of action. Furthermore, approaches of 
rational choice institutionalism underline that state’s incentives for reducing 
uncertainty depends on the institutional design to maximize their utilities (Lowndes, 
95-96). In that regard, Robert Keohane and Lise Martin (1995:43-44) argue that by 
securing more information states can come to agree on which of multiple outcomes 
are preferred and thereby may it be possible to follow policies more nearly the 
maximize utility of an equilibrium. Accordingly, we should assume that formal 
structures and rules of institutions created to increase information sharing would 
lead to increased collective outcomes. Another reason for why increased 
coordination meetings may affect state behavior is based on the assumption that it 
would enable compromises, which should lead to reaching an equilibrium of 
preferences and a collective beneficial outcome6. Furthermore, Robert Keohane and 
Stanley Hoffman underline the importance of ‘convergence of preferences’ 
(1991:23) in studying institutional changes. Following arguments of rational choice 
approaches on institutions we should assume that more coordination meetings 
means increased information sharing and increased knowledge and understanding 
about the fellow participant preferences. This in turn is assumed to affect actors’ 
available strategic choices.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Which could be viewed in line with Ernst B. Haas’s notion of ‘suprananationality’: referring to a decision 
making form within which “participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain 
agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests” (1964:66).   
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Nevertheless, we now turn to a short discussion about the above mentioned 
dimension on the hierarchical decision structure of the policy. The hierarchical 
decision structure is based on the rational choice assumption that states by engaging 
in institutional settings delegate mandate to other actors. Accordingly, we should 
assume that actors delegate coordination matters in order to ensure exchange of 
information of the concerned actors preferences and strategies should lead to 
increased collective beneficial outcomes. As observed by Clara Portela and Kolja 
Raube a hierarchical structure of policy is needed in order for states to coordinate 
their actions, by stating that otherwise “internal forces would produce a clash and 
whirlwind of different external policies” (Portela –  Raube 2009:4). Furthermore, 
according to a rational choice institutionalism perspective states may delegate 
coordination in order to reduce transaction costs of determining common solutions 
(Scharpf, 1999:165-166; Keohane, 1984).  
Therefore, from a rational choice version we should assume that: changes in the 
hierarchal structure on coordination, by centralizing responsibility for 
coordination, decreases available strategic choices as well as transaction costs and 
increases information sharing, thereby the collective beneficial outcomes.    
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4 Method 
The following section, present the research design applied in order to assess 
different theoretical explanations as to why institutional changes would affect the 
vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy and how it has developed 
over time. The section therefore discuss and motivate the methodological choices 
made in order to answer the research question.  
4.1 Explaining the Effects of Institutional Changes 
on the Vertical Coherence of EU’s Foreign Policy   
In the search for explanations of why institutional changes would affect states 
behavior, and thereby the policy outcome, the basic argument of this research is 
that by contrasting different theoretical definitions of institutions to the study of 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy over time and viewing different findings 
as complementary we will be able to find explanations to the why-question. 
Nonetheless, this does not rule out the fact that by comparing over time some 
explanation(s) may prove to be more convincing than others. The two different 
‘aspects’ on the effects of institutional changes are derived from competing versions 
of institutionalism and are tested against the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign 
policy over a time period. As set out in the section on ‘theoretical point of departure’ 
the two versions of institutionalism emphasized in this research are the normative 
and rational choice perspectives. While the latter define institutions in terms of 
formal structures and rules, the former conceptualizes institutions in terms of 
informal rules.  
Robert O. Keohane and Lise Martin (1995:47) observed the difficulties of 
finding an optimal situation to test the impact of institutions. Nonetheless, by 
assessing what kind of events that should have preceded the institutional changes 
according to the different theoretical aspects, we should be able to find time periods 
during which institutional changes of coordination on the Union’s foreign policy 
occurred. These two competing versions of institutionalism are therefore applied in 
order to outline the institutional changes on the coordination of the European 
Union’s CFSP after the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty. In that regard, 
the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism enables an 
identification of under which Treaties, and thus time periods, the different 
institutional settings of coordination were intensified. These periods are than 
contrasted against the propositions derived from the competing theoretical 
explanations. Therefore by comparing the different institutional changes, according 
to the proposed theoretical propositions, over a period of time we might assess their 
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effects on state behavior and thereby policy outcomes (Levy, 2008:5). In other 
words, in order to explain the effects of institutional changes on the vertical 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy, the propositions are applied as both analytical 
tools to identify institutional changes of the Unions’ CFSP over time and as 
theoretical tools to assess its effect on state behavior.  
Moreover, the term ‘proposition’ is used instead if the commonly known term 
hypothesis (George – Bennett, 2005). The reason for this is that the research is not 
designed to develop a new theory regarding the effects of institutional change on 
state behavior and thereby policy outcomes. As already underlined the rational 
choice and normative versions of institutionalism are rather to be seen as 
complementary as their different definitions of institutions also means that they 
encompass different time periods for when changes should have an effect. 
Nevertheless, in order to give an account of why institutional change effect the 
behavior of Member States and thereby the Union’s foreign policy we derive 
propositions from the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism 
which can be empirically tested. As pointed out by Keohane and Martin (1995), 
namely that “the point of new theory is to generate testable hypotheses and liberal 
institutionalism only has value insofar as it generates propositions that can be tested 
against real evidence” (1995:46). Accordingly, the proposed propositions derived 
from the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism can be viewed 
as a contribution to the versions assumptions on the effects of institutional change 
in that it test it ‘against real evidence’. 
This further raises the question of whether the findings in this research can be 
applied to other cases. The findings of this study should first and foremost be related 
to the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international organizations. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the theoretical findings could not be applied 
to other cases. On the one hand, one might argue in general terms that the theoretical 
findings could be applied to domestic, regional as well as international  
organizations which are changing the institutional settings in order to affect the 
behavior of its members ,and thereby the collective outcome. This argument should 
than be underlined by the fact that the theoretical assumptions on the effects of 
institutional change is based on scholars of both political science and international 
relations. On the other hand, one might argue that in order to determine whether the 
propositions derived in this thesis are applicable to other cases, further research 
needs to be conducted (George – Bennets, 2005:123-124).  
4.2 Comparing Cross Time 
Following the argument in the section above, in order to determine the theoretical 
explanation on the effects of institutional changes on states behavior and collective 
foreign policy outcomes we test their respective assumption over a period of time. 
In order to assess whether the normative or the rational choice version of 
institutionalism contributes with the most applicable explanation we compare the 
vertical coherence of EU’ foreign policy during sessions at the First Committee of 
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the United Nations General Assembly, hereinafter also referred to as ‘UNGA’. In 
other words, we focus on the relation between the institutional changes according 
to the theoretical approaches and the outcome of vertical coherence of EU’s foreign 
policy in the UNGA. The First Committee has dealt with matters of disarmament 
and international security since the establishment of UNGA in 1945. The foreign 
and security issues addressed at meetings during different sessions of the First 
Committee are of general concern to the Member States’ of the EU and of the Union 
as a whole and thereby constitutes a forum of relevance in comparing the vertical 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy over time. The effect of institutional changes on 
the vertical coherence of the Union’s foreign policy is compared during the time 
period of 1998-2013. The study thereby encompasses institutional changes with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty.  
In doing so, this research begins with studying the vertical coherence of EU’s 
foreign policy during the 53rd session, which occurred before the establishment of 
the Amsterdam Treaty. Subsequently, in line with the argument by a rational choice 
institutionalism perspective that an effect in state behavior should occur shortly 
after an institutional change, this thesis therefore addresses the 54th session. 
According to normative version of institutionalism we should expect long term 
changes in state behavior and thereby assume some effects on the vertical coherence 
at the 63rd session in 2008. Furthermore, in order to determine the explanatory 
power of the different propositions on the effects of institutional changes on state 
behavior this research encompasses the sessions held at the United General 
Assembly from 2008-2013. During the 66th session during the time period 2011-
2012 at the United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament and the 
International Security Committee held in total 25 meetings between the 16 
September 2011 and the 4 September 2012 (United Nations, 2013a:x). The EU did 
not have any statements during the 25 meetings of the First Committee (United 
Nations, 2012a:45-47). Nevertheless, the Member States held in total national 
statements on different agenda items at 22 meetings (United Nations, 2012b:48-
164) 7. Consequently, the 66th, session is not studied per se, rather the 53rd, 54th, 
63rd, 65th and the 67th sessions are addressed and thereby this thesis compare over 
the time period of 1998-2013. 
4.3 Data Collection 
In order to conduct the above emphasized qualitative research design of this thesis 
and in answering the research question both primary and secondary literature are 
used. Following subsection encompasses the choice of data collected in this 
research.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 For further information on which meeting member state’s held national statements’ please see Annex 1. 
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4.3.1 Primary Literature 
The data collected on the primary literature constitutes of inter alia theoretical 
scholars of institutionalism. For instance, in Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance (1990) Douglass North points out the effects of 
institutionalism from a rational choice perspective. Moreover, Jack Knight (1992) 
also underlines definitions of institutions in accordance with a rational choice 
perspective on institutions. The books and articles by James March and Johan Olsen 
(1984; 1986; 1989; 1998; 2006), Robert O. Keohane and Lise Martin (1995) are 
encompassed under the normative version of institutionalism. Nonetheless, these 
scholars does not explicitly label themselves under normative or rational choice 
versions of institutionalism. Through their character as ‘primary’ literature, 
meaning that no one has already drawn conclusions from the scholars’ theoretical 
thoughts, we are able to draw conclusions of the literature. Consequently, the 
scholar have been encompassed under the versions of institutionalism due to their 
definition of institutions as well as assumption on how and why institutions effect 
states behavior, and thus the policy outcome.  
Further primary literature collected in this study are official documents of the 
UN and the EU, as well as press releases. For instance the United Nations 
document: Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly summarizes the speeches 
held by states and regions at the annual Committee meetings and agenda items. 
Therefore the amount of EU statements as well as national statements by Member 
States of the European Union held during the 53rd, 54th, 63rd, 64th, 65th and 67th 
session of the First Committee are collected through the Index to Proceedings of 
the General Assembly. Moreover, data is collected from official documents of the 
United Nations in order to clarify the subject of the agenda items. In additional 
official EU documents, such as press releases, speeches, Council Decisions and 
reports which are of importance in order to link the versions of institutionalism in 
this study with empirical data shall be collected.   
4.3.2 Secondary Literature 
The so-called secondary literature applied in this thesis is research conducted by 
other researcher, meaning that the literature has already been processed and 
analyzed. Consequently, the secondary literature used are from scholars which have 
already tried to interpret the main theoretical assumptions of institutionalism. These 
are inter alia Institutional Theory in Political Science (2012) by Guy Peters; 
Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism (1996) by Peter Hall and 
Rosemary Taylor; as well as The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist approaches 
to the study of Europe (2001) by Gerald Schneider and Mark Aspinwall, which 
provides with an insight on the general distinctions of institutionalism in the 
literature. Furthermore, secondary literature used in this study is inter alia books 
and academic on existing studies of Treaty changes. The criticisms with secondary 
literature is that it may misled the researcher into ‘false’ direction. In that regard, 
one might argue that this problem can, to some extent, be dealt with by always 
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questioning the validity and reliability of the literature at hand, and by complement 
the questionable assumptions with primary literature.  
4.3.3 Operationalization  
First we need to clarify how to measure vertical coherence of the European Union’s 
foreign policy. Consequently, we shall reiterate this thesis definition of vertical 
coherence, namely the consistency between Member States and EU’s action, as well 
as the definition of EU’s foreign policy as ‘an umbrella term for the national foreign 
policy of the Member States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. In 
other words, vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy occurs when Member States 
and the Union acts in accordance with each other on matters of foreign policy. 
Applied to this research, an indication for vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy 
would be when the EU delivers a statement on agenda items at meetings of the First 
Committee and the Member States does not give a national statement at the same 
meeting and on the same agenda items. Accordingly, if the amount of EU 
statements, without Member States having national statements at the same meeting 
and on the same agenda items, increases compared to the previous session the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has increased. The same logic applies 
when determining whether or not the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has 
decreased. The UN document on: Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly is 
used in order to determine at which meetings and on which agenda items the EU 
and the Member States delivered statements.  
Furthermore, in order to assess the theoretical explanations as to why 
institutional change(s) affect states behavior to coordinate their action in 
international organizations we should identify relevant indicators thereto. 
According to the normative version of institutionalism symbolic action and the 
political rhetoric are necessary long term means to change the normative foundation 
of coherence, and thereby state action. Therefore, should official EU documents 
such as press releases and speeches by ‘reformers’ on the changed symbolic actions 
during a long time be seen as an indicator for the goal of a reorganization or reform  
to affect the states behavior. Nevertheless, an indicator on the development of the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy is the action by Member States, in terms 
of delivered statements at the UNGA sessions. Moreover, a rational choice 
perspective of institutional changes underlines changes in the hierarchical structural 
of responsibilities over coordination according to Treaty provision as an indication 
for increased collective outcomes and thereby increased vertical coherence of the 
European Union’s foreign policy.  
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5 Institutional Changes with the Treaty 
of Lisbon  
The following section outline the pre-existing Treaty provisions on the coordination 
of EU’s foreign policy in order to understand and determine changes with the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the Amsterdam Treaty. In connection with the latter, we will 
emphasize the institutional changes on coordination of EU’s foreign policy by 
comparing provisions set out in the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, the Nice 
Treaty stipulates the same provisions for coordination of foreign policy as the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Therefore, in outlining the changed provisions with the Lisbon 
Treaty we are comparing with those set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. The section 
begins with addressing the formal structural changes of importance according to 
rational choice institutionalism. Thereafter, we discuss the symbolic changes with 
the Lisbon Treaty which in line with a normative version of institutionalism are 
necessary to change the normative foundation of institutions.       
5.1 Constrains through Centralized Coordination 
Responsibilities 
The Maastricht Treaty created the three pillar structure, which in turn characterized 
the provisions until the Lisbon Treaty. The CFSP existed within the so-called 
second pillar. The coordination of EU’s foreign and security policy was managed 
by Member States rotating presidency in connection with the Secretariat General. 
Nevertheless, with the Amsterdam Treaty the Secretariat General of the Council 
where given an increased role of coordination through the creation of the post High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The structure of 
coordination was therefore characterized by: the Council of Ministers, hereinafter 
also referred to as ‘the Council’, should in accordance to Article 13 (4) EU 
recommend common positions to the European Council and implement them 
through the instruments of the CFSP. In other words, the Council had the mandate 
to ensure “unity, consistency and effectiveness of EU action with the principles and 
guidelines for CFSP and its common strategies”. The Presidency of the Council was 
assisted by the Secretariat General of the Council, Javier Solana, who also had the 
role of the High Representative on matters within the scope of the CFSP. The High 
Representative should particularly assist the Council in contribution with policy 
formulation, preparation and implementation of decisions (Craig, 2010:405-407; 
Chalmers et.al, 2010:660; Maganza, 1999:178). 
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After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European Council and the 
Council still have the mandate to define a common approach of the Union. 
Nonetheless, the Lisbon treaty created the post of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy which was given an increased role 
with responsibility to ensure implementation of the decision adopted by the 
European Council and the Council (Craig, 2010:406-413; Article 26-27 TEU; 
Chalmers et. al, 2010:663-664). The High Representative shall be assisted by a 
European External action Service, hereinafter also referred to as ‘the EEAS’, in 
order to fulfill its mandate (Article 27 (3) TEU). The organization and functioning 
of the EEAS was adopted by the Council on July the 26th 2010 and established by 
Council Decision 2010/427/EU. The function of the EEAS is stipulated in Article 
27 (3) of the Treaty of the European Union and shall accordingly ‘work in 
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States’. Nonetheless, 
Council Decision 2010/42/EU further encompasses the function and scope of the 
EEAS. Article 1 (2) of the Council Decision set out EEAS as a ‘functionally 
autonomous body’ and Article 1 (3) further emphasizes the scope of EEAS by 
stipulating that ‘The EEAS shall be made up of a central administrative 
administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international 
organizations’.  
The function of the EEAS is set out in Article 2 (1) which stipulates that it shall 
support the High Representative to conduct CFSP, including the Common Security 
and Defense Policy, and contribute to the formulation and preparation of proposals 
in the field of CFSP. Furthermore, the EEAS shall support the High Representative 
in ensuring consistency and coordination of the Union’s external action. As regards 
Article 2 (1) Steven Blockmans and Christophe Hillion argue that compared with 
the Lisbon Treaties the EEAS is given increased “coherence-mandate” with the 
Council Decision 2010/427/EU. Theses authors argues that by reproduce Article 18 
(4) TEU, stipulating tasks in relation to consistency of EU external action, in Article 
2 (1) the task of the EEAS is not simply to ensure coordination and consistency of 
CFSP, but rather of the EU external relations as a whole (2013:25-29). 
Nevertheless, the emphasis of this research is on the vertical coherence of EU’s 
foreign policy and therefore from a rational choice version of institutionalism we 
should underline the function of the EEAS to support the High Representative in 
ensuring the consistency and coordination of CFSP at international organizations.  
The transformation to EU delegations constitutes a further structural change on 
coordination which was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. The role of Union 
delegations is stipulated in Article 221 (1) TFEU by which ‘Union delegations in 
third countries and at international organizations shall represent the Union’. This 
was further emphasized in an EEAS document on the EU diplomatic 
representations, in which it was underlined that the delegations had the 
responsibility of coordinating. The shift from Commission delegations to EU 
delegations has meant that the diplomats of the Member States holding the rotating 
Presidency no longer have the responsibilities to coordinate EU positions and local 
representation of EU statements (EEAS, 2012; 2011:16; Blockmans – Hillion, 
2013:56). The delegations will form part of the EEAS. 
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Furthermore, the purpose of Union delegations is set out in Article 5 (9) of the 
Council Decision 2010/427/EU, in which it is stated that ‘The Union delegations 
shall work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services 
of the Member States’. The task of Union delegations to cooperate and share 
information with Member States’ diplomatic services has raised questions of 
whether or not Article 5 (9) require an ‘exchange’ of information. Nevertheless, 
Member States are already obligated to share information with EU delegations in 
accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU and the 
loyalty obligation in Article 24(3) TEU. Furthermore, they are also obliged to share 
information through the revised and expanded version of Article 32 (3) TEU which 
stipulates that Member States’ diplomatic missions and the Union delegation at 
international organizations shall cooperate to formulate a common approach. 
Moreover according to Article 34 TEU Member States are obliged to coordinate 
their action in international organizations and shall uphold the EU position 
(Blockmans – Hillion, 2013:58; Craig, 2010:410).  
Therefore from a rational choice version on the effect of institutional changes, 
the EEAS and EU delegations are encompassed as centralized coordination 
responsibilities as they through their mandate to prepare and formulate proposals 
can affect available choices, and thereby Member States’ strategies. 
5.2 Change Symbols for Changed Behavior 
The normative version of institutionalism underline that changes of normative 
foundations occurs through symbolic means. Consequently, with the Amsterdam 
Treaty we should from a normative institutionalism perspective emphasize the 
establishment of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union. As regards the 
Lisbon Treaty we should emphasize the establishment of an external action service 
in form of the EEAS as well as the Union delegations. The Commission delegations 
were formally transformed with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 
December 2009 into EU delegations. In other words, the implementation of Article 
221 (1) TFEU meant that former ‘Commission Delegations’ became ‘Union 
delegations’ (EEAS, 2011:16). The transformation to EU delegations aimed 
moving away from the international presence through delegations of the 
Commission, which only constituted one of EU’s institutions. The creating of EU 
delegations should therefore enable a single diplomatic presence of the Union as a 
whole and speaking on behalf of a single legal entity at third countries and 
international organizations (Blockmans – Hillion, 2013:56). Furthermore, 
according to a normative version of institutionalism the mandate of the High 
Representative to formulate a proposal on the organization and functioning of the 
EEAS, as set out in Article 27 (3) TEU, means that the High Representative acts as 
a ‘reformer’ who affects the normative foundation of institutions through their 
political rhetoric.  
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6 EU and MS’ Statements at UNGA 
The following section outline the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 
53rd, 54th, 63rd, 64th, 65th and the 67th session of the First Committee.  This 
section is divided into three subsections, within which the institutional changes 
emphasized by the normative and rational choice version of institutionalism are 
encompassed. Moreover sequent subsections also analyzes the amount of 
statements held by the EU, without Member States giving national statements at the 
same meeting and on the same agenda item. 
6.1 Vertical Coherence Pre-Lisbon  
This sub-section outline the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy pre-Lisbon, 
by emphasizing the EU as well as the Member States’ statements delivered at the 
53rd, 54th and 63rd session of United Nations General Assembly First Committee.  
6.1.1 1998-1999: Statements Delivered under the Maastricht Treaty  
During the United Nations General Assembly 53rd session at the Disarmament and 
the International Security Committee, the so-called First Committee, 31 meetings 
were held between September 9 and November 13, 1998 (United Nations, 2000a:4). 
The EU delivered statements on behalf of the Member States at the 3rd, 13th, 21st, 
24th, 27th and at the 31st meeting (United Nations, 2000b:42-46). Even though, 
Germany gave national statements at the 21st and 24th meeting on other agenda 
items than 74G ‘Relationship between disarmament and development measures’ or 
71I ’Convention of the 4th special session of the General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament’, on which the EU held statements (United Nations, 1998a, 1998b; 
2000b:49). The same goes for the national statements delivered by Germany, Spain, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom at the 27th meeting. During the 27th meeting 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom held national statements on agenda item 
71P ’Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons’, and Portugal as well as the United 
Kingdom gave national statements on agenda item 73B ’Report on the Conference 
on Disarmament’, while the statement by EU encompassed agenda item 71E 
‘Transparency in armaments’ and 71Q ‘Regional disarmament’ (United Nations, 
1998c; 2000b: 49-158).  
In sum, either Member States’ national statements at the 21st, 24st or the 27th 
meeting encompassed the same agenda items as was addressed by the EU 
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statements. Consequently, out of EU delivered statements during six meetings 
neither one of them where overlapped by Member States’ national statements, 
meaning that Member States did not express their national position at the same 
meetings and on the same agenda items as the Union.  
6.1.2 1999-2000: Statements Delivered during the Amsterdam Treaty  
The 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the First Committee had 
28 meetings between September 14 and November 11, 1999. Since the Amsterdam 
Treaty entered into force May 1, 1999 (European Union, 2009), the Member States 
were during the 54h session obliged to act in accordance with the provisions therein. 
From a rational choice version of institutionalism assumption that institutional 
constrains are short-termed, we should assume that Member States adopt to the new 
structures and rules of coordination shortly after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into 
force. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, and thereby the establishment of the High 
Representative, entered into force four months before the 54th session began we 
should expect Member States acting towards a collective beneficial outcome, 
meaning an increased vertical coherence.  
From a normative institutionalism perspective we should argue that the role of 
a Secretariat General of the Council and High Representative of the European 
Union for the CFSP has, at the time being, recently entered into force, and thereby 
the political rhetoric about the expectations of the reorganization on the 
coordination of action. For instance on October the 18, 1999 Javier Solana made 
remarks on its role as Secretariat General and High Representative and the future 
of the Unions foreign and security policy by stating that: “We do not start in a 
vacuum. The European Union is already a global player on the world stage”. 
Nevertheless, Solana further pointed at requirements necessary to become a more 
influential actor on the global stage by inter alia underlining that “Europe has to be 
able and willing to define its common interests. Europe has to be determined to 
pursue them in the international arena” (European Council, 1999). According to a 
normative perspective on institutional change Member States are therefore not 
expected to change their behavior, rather to act in accordance with previous 53rd 
session. 
During the 54th session the EU held statements at the 3rd, 19th, 22nd, 25th, 
26th and the 27th meeting (United Nations, 2011b:33-36). Sweden held a national 
statement at the 19th meeting on agenda item 80 ‘Convention on prohibitions or 
restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects’, whereas the EU gave a 
statement on agenda items 76 ‘General and complete disarmament’ and 85 
’Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty’ (United Nations, 1999; 2011b: 99). 
Nevertheless, at the 25th meeting Belgium, France and Portugal held national 
statements on the same agenda item as the EU, namely item 76f ‘Small arms’. 
Moreover, either the national statements by Belgium or the United Kingdom at the 
26th meeting addressed agenda item 76b ‘Transparency in armaments’, on which 
the European Union delivered a statement. Nonetheless, France gave a statement 
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on agenda item 76b at the 26th meeting and thereby stated their national position at 
the same meeting and on the same item as the EU delivered a statement on behalf 
of its Member States (United Nations, 1999; 2011b:9, 33-39, 84). 
From a rational choice perspective on institutional change we should have 
assumed that the created post of a High Representative was able to affect the 
Member States’ strategies and preference. However instead of increased collective 
position, the Member States had in comparison with the 53rd session more 
frequently statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items as the 
EU. Nonetheless, from a normative institutionalism perspective we should expect 
the symbolic action by establishing a High Representative, aiming at ensuring 
consistency of the European Union’s foreign policy, effected the normative 
foundation of coherence through a long termed process of learning. In other words, 
through frequent interaction between Member States and political rhetoric on the 
expectations with the creation of a High Representative could the normative 
foundation of coherence change, and thereby state behavior.  
In sum, the EU held during the 54th session statements at six meetings, from 
which Member States had statements on the same agenda items at the 25th as well 
as the 26tht meeting. Therefore, we might argue that vertical coherence of the EU’s 
foreign policy was the case at four out of six meetings during the 54th session at 
the First Committee.    
6.1.3 2008-2009: Statements Delivered under the Nice Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty had not entered into force during the 63rd session and thereby 
was neither the EEAS nor the EU delegations formalized. The structures and rules 
of coordination actions were rather set out in the Treaty of Nice which in turn was 
the same as stipulated in the Amsterdam Treaty. Nevertheless, the expectation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon is exemplified with the by the European Council in 2008, by 
stating that: 
 
Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, 
and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through 
better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this 
(European Council, 2008). 
 
The United Nations General Assembly sixty-third session at the First Committee, 
held in total 22 meetings, from which the last meeting was on October 31, 2008 
(United Nations, 2010a:4). The EU held statements at the 2nd, 8th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 
20th and 21st meeting. During the 2nd, 8th, 16th and the 21st meeting the EU gave 
statements on agenda items without additional national statements by Member 
States of the Union. Even though Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands held 
statements on the 20th meeting none of them addressed the agenda items 88 
’Prevention of an arms race in outer space’ or 94 ‘Strengthening of security and 
cooperation in the Mediterranean region’, which were encompassed in the 
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statement by the EU (United Nations, 2008a; 2010b:11, 36-37, 59, 79). Moreover, 
neither the national statements by Hungary nor Italy during the 11th meeting 
encompassed the agenda items 89b ’Missiles’ nor 89 ‘General and complete 
disarmament’ on which the EU delivered a statement regarding the position of the 
Union (United Nations, 2008b; 2010b:49, 69). Nevertheless, during the 12th 
meeting Denmark as well as the EU held statements on agenda item 89c ‘Problems 
arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus’ 
(United Nations, 2008c; 2010b:31, 37).  
In sum, the EU held during the 67th session statements at seven meetings, and 
out of these they delivered statements, without Member states expressing their 
positions in national statements on the same agenda items, in total at six meetings.      
6.2 2009-2010: What to Expect When You’re 
Expecting the Unexpected  
During the 64th session at the United Nations General Assembly, the First 
Committee held 24 meetings on disarmament and international security. These 
meetings were held between October 1 and November 2, 2009. The last meeting 
was held June 11, 2010 (United Nations, 2011a:4). Since the Lisbon Treaty and the 
EU delegations were formally launched at the first December 2009, we should, 
according to normative institutionalism, during this time period expect increased 
political rhetoric on the establishment of the EEAS and EU delegations. For 
instance in a press release November 2009 the General Secretariat of the Council 
emphasized the symbolic shift of delegations, by underlining that:  
 
The Commission’s delegations will become Union delegations under the 
authority of the High representative and will be a part of the EEAS structure. 
[…]. EU delegations will work in close cooperation with diplomatic services 
of the Member States” (General Secretariat, 2009:3).  
 
As of the first December 2009 Commission delegations became EU delegations, or 
as the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine informed: “The Delegation of the European 
Commission will become as of today the Delegation of the European Union” 
(Delegation, 2009). In that regard, a normative version of institutionalism would 
view the High Representative Catharine Ashton, with the authority to form a 
European action service, as a ‘reformer’ advocating for the expectations as well as 
meaning of a European external action service. For instance, in a speech on March 
the 23rd, 2010 Catharine Ashton stated that:  
 
[…] the creation of the EEAS is a huge change for Europe. A once-in a 
generation opportunity to build something that finally brings together all the 
instruments of our engagement […] in support for a single political strategy. 
[…].So we must have a system that promotes comprehensive strategies and 
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joined-up action – not where, as today, we try to work comprehensive despite 
our system” (European Commission, 2010a).  
 
In connection with the speech by Catharine Ashton, a normative institutionalism 
would argue that EEAS is used as symbolic means to shape the normative formative 
foundations of coherence and thereby the Member States preferences to co-ordinate 
their foreign politics and collective action. Furthermore, from a normative version 
of institutionalism we should assume that reformers also use political rhetoric in 
order to shape the world view of the EU’s Member States. This can be exemplified 
by Catharine Ashton’s speech on March the 25th, 2010:  
        
Europe needs the EEAS. Because we must adapt to a world of growing 
complexity and fundamental power shifts. We can only punch our weight if 
we bring together all our instruments – economic and political, development 
and security, crisis management and long term engagement – in support of a 
single political strategy. The Lisbon Treaty offers precisely the opportunity to 
build a modern policy for the modern world – moving beyond traditional 
“diplomacy” (European Commission, 2010b). 
 
The symbolic as well as rhetoric means used by reformers in order to affect state 
behavior, can be further exemplified by a press release of the 3010th Council of 
European Union meeting on April the 26th, 2010 in stating that:  
 
The creation of the EEAS is one of the most significant changes introduced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. It aims to enable greater coherence and efficiency in 
the EU’s external action and increase its political and economic influence in 
the world (Council of the European Union, 2010:8).  
 
From the press release by the Council of the European Union we might assume that 
the Member States at a marginal have accepted the political discourse on the 
changed symbols. Nonetheless, from a normative version of institutionalism we 
should assume that rather the action of states determines whether or not the 
normative foundation of coherence has changed as an effect of the symbolic actions 
and political rhetoric. Furthermore, in a speech on February the 8th,, 2011 to the 
United Nations Security Council, Catherine Ashton emphasized the establishment 
of the EEAS by stating that:  
 
The Lisbon Treaty is now in force. This is a historic step which matters to 
Europeans and non-Europeans alike. The Lisbon Treaty offers the opportunity 
to strengthen the EU's international impact and strategic vision, through 
streamlined decision-making and greater policy coherence and consistency. 
The European External Action Service will lead to more integrated policy-
making and delivery, by bringing together all the instruments of our global 
engagement […]. This should also make the EU a better partner for the UN 
(European Union, 2010). 
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6.2.1 EU Statements at the Sixty-fourth Session 
At the 64th session the EU held statements at the 9th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 22nd 
and 23rd First Committee meeting (United Nations, 2011b:41-44). In line with a 
normative perspective on institutional changes we should further emphasize the 
long-term learning process for normative foundations of institutions to change. 
Applied to this session, we should assume that as the EU delegations were 
formalized during this session the Member States have not had the time to increase 
their interaction or to share experiences. Therefore, we should according to 
normative institutionalism expect Member States to behave in a similarly to the 
63rd session. From a rational choice version of institutionalism we should in turn 
expect Member States  to adopt to the new structures of EU delegations relatively 
shortly after their formalization. The formalization of Union delegations with the 
Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 meant that Member States as well as the 
delegations should increase their information sharing. An increased exchange of 
information should according to a rational choice perspective affect their strategic 
calculations and thereby the collective outcome. Accordingly, we should expect an 
increased vertical coherence at the 23rd meeting. 
During the 64th session the EU held statements, without Member States 
delivering national statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items 
as the Union, at the 9th and 13th meeting. At the 12th meeting the European Union 
held a statement on agenda items: 96q ‘Measures to prevent terrorists from 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction’; 96k ‘Implementation of the convention on 
the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical 
weapons and in their destruction’; and 103 ‘Convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and 
their destruction’ (United Nations, 2009b). Nonetheless, during the 12th meeting 
Hungary stated their national position in connection with agenda item 103, whereas 
a statement was delivered by Poland on agenda item 96k. Hungary and Poland 
thereby addressed the same agenda items at the same meeting as the EU gave a 
statement.  
Moreover, during the 18th meeting Austria held a statement on agenda item 98 
‘Report on the convention of disarmament’, while at the 19th meeting Spain held a 
statement on agenda item 88 ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty’. 
Following that line, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Germany gave 
national statements at the 22th meeting on agenda item 96z ‘Towards an arms trade 
treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and 
transfer of conventional arms’ (United Nations, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e). 
Consequently, agenda items 96k, 98, 88 and 96z were addressed in statements by 
both the EU and the Member States (United Nations, 2011b: 46-50). Furthermore, 
at the 23rd meeting, during which we should according to rational choice 
institutionalism expect an increased vertical coherence, the EU as well as Austria, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom held statements on agenda item 
93 ’General and complete disarmament’ (United Nations, 2009a). In sum, during 
the 64th session EU held statements on behalf of the Member States, excluding 
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national statements by Member States at the same meetings and on same items, 
during three meetings.  
6.3 2010-2011: Let’s Talk the Talk and Walk the 
Walk 
During the 65th session at the United Nations General Assembly, the First 
Committee had 23 meetings between October the 1st and October the 29th 2010, and 
one meeting at June the 22nd 2011 (United Nations, 2013a:x). The EEAS was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers on July the 26th, 2010 and 27 new Heads of 
Delegation and 1 Deputy Head of EU Delegation was decided on September the 
15th 2010 by the High Representative (European Commission, 2010c). From a 
normative version of institutionalism we should still anticipate that Member States  
are in the so-called ‘learning process’, meaning that the political rhetoric on the 
expectations of EEAS and EU delegations are still of importance for changes in the 
normative foundation of coherence and thereby state action. In connection with the 
importance of reformers political rhetoric, Catharine Ashton underlined in a speech 
on July the 7th 2010 to the European Parliament the importance of a European 
external action service for Europe by stating that:  
 
We cannot afford to act in a disparate manner in a world that is seeing 
fundamental power shifts and where problems are increasingly complex and 
inter-linked. We need to defend Europe's interests and project Europe's values 
in a more coherent and effective way. And we should be ambitious in how we 
do it (European Commission, 2010d). 
 
Furthermore, in the same speech Catharine Ashton emphasized the meaning of an 
EEAS for the European Union’s foreign policy:  
 
Europe needs the External Action Service to build a stronger foreign policy. 
We need an integrated platform to project European values and interests 
around the world. It is time to give ourselves the means to realize our 
ambitions. It is time to get the right people in place to start doing the necessary 
work (European Commission, 2010d). 
 
Moreover, according to a normative version of institutionalism, the speeches by 
Catherine Ashton shapes the actors perceptions about the world as complex and 
almost unmanageable without an European external action service, which in turn 
shall work for the interests and values of Europe. The political rhetoric by Catharine 
Ashton on the necessity of an external action service in order for Europe to address 
matters of international security, is further stressed in a speech to the European 
Parliament on October the 20th 2010: 
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The lives of the citizens of Europe are touched by the foreign policy every 
day. […] What we are doing in terms of counter-terrorism and security issues 
also helps keep people safe. So it maters hugely that Europe is a foreign policy 
actor and is able to operate in the world. I want the people of Europe to 
understand and recognize that and to support us in the work we are doing 
(European Commission, 2010e). 
 
Form a normative version of institutionalism, one could argue that in the statement 
delivered on October the 20th 2010 the ‘reformer’ tried to affect the actors world 
view by encompassing the security threats which citizens of Europe are facing, such 
as terrorism. Furthermore, in a speech on January the 19th at the official opening of 
the EU Delegation to the Council of Europe Catharine Ashton encompasses the 
expectations of increased coordination and consistency, in stating that:  
 
The creation of the EEAS is also a major change and a step forward in creating 
a more coherent and consistent EU foreign policy; opening of EU Delegation 
to Council of Europe is an important step to strengthen coordination and 
partnership. We should continue to back one-another up, to improve shared 
values. As Europe is changing, our cooperation is changing (European 
Commission, 2011a). 
 
Nonetheless, in a speech 8 February 2011 to the United Nations Security Council 
Catherine Ashton emphasized the expected effect with the establishment of the 
EEAS, by stating that:  
 
When I spoke to the Security Council last year, I updated you on the progress 
regarding the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the promises this held 
for strengthening the EU’s contribution to addressing international concerns. 
[…] In our view the Lisbon Treaty and the External Action Service are not 
just good for Europe. They also make us a better partner for the UN. We are 
grateful for your help in recognizing this (European Commission, 2011b). 
 
This statement encompasses the reformer’s expectation that reorganizations are 
necessary means in order to change state behavior as well as the assumption that 
EEAS is of importance for the performance of Member States at the international 
arena. 
Nevertheless, from a rational choice version of institutionalism we should 
expect Member States to adopt their actions in accordance with the new structures 
and rules with the establishment of EEAS and EU delegations. According to 
rational choice institutionalism the structures of an administrative body with 
responsibility to coordinate Member States and EU action by preparing positions 
and policy proposals enables the external action service to affect the strategic 
available choices of actors and thereby their preferences. Furthermore structures 
and rules aiming at increasing exchange of information decreases the uncertainties, 
thereby increases the collective action. Therefore, according to a rational choice 
version of institutionalism we should expect the changed structural procedures of 
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coordination, in comparison with the 64th session, to increase the vertical coherence 
of EU’ foreign policy at the 65th session.  
6.3.1 EU Statements at the Sixty-fifth Session 
The EU held statements at the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 18th and 19th meeting of 
the sixty-fifth session at the First Committee (United Nations, 2012b:8-164). 
Member States held national statements on agenda items in connection with the five 
latter meetings. Even though Malta held a statement at the 17th meeting; Hungary, 
the Netherlands as well as Poland gave national statements during the 18th meeting; 
and the fact that national statements were given by France, Ireland, Italy and 
Slovenia at the 19th meeting neither one of them addressed the same agenda items 
as the EU (United Nations, 2012b:62-126). During the 12th meeting on October the 
18th, both the Netherlands and Austria held national statements on agenda item 99a 
’Report of the conference on disarmament’. Furthermore, at the same meeting Italy 
held a national statement on agenda item 97q ’Reducing nuclear danger’ (United 
Nations, 2010a). Consequently during the 12th meeting Member States delivered 
national statements under the same agenda items as were addressed in a statement 
by the Union. At the 13th meeting the EU held a statement under agenda items 97s 
‘Regional disarmament’ and 97z ‘The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
in all its aspects’ (United Nations, 2011b:8-164; United Nations, 2010b). However, 
both France and Finland also held national statements on agenda item 97z (United 
Nations, 2011b:51). 
 In sum, during the 65th session the Member States of the European Union 
delivered national statements on the same agenda items and at only one meeting as 
the EU.  
6.4 2012-2013: Time for Institutional Changes to 
Rise and Shine 
During the 67th session at the United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament 
and the International Security Committee held in total 22 meetings between October 
the 5th and November the 7th, 2012 (United Nations, 2013a:x). From a normative 
institutionalism perspective we should continue to underline that the changes in the 
normative foundation of institutions are occurring through reformers political 
rhetoric on the symbolic changes and Member States interaction thereon. For 
instance, in a speech September the 11th 2012 to the European Parliament on the 
Annual Report on CFSP Catharine Ashton underlined the importance of a European 
diplomatic service by stating that:   
 
The network of EU Delegations is the greatest asset we have. […] The great 
strength of the EU, working with Member States and international partners, is 
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the range of diplomatic tools at its disposal. By mobilizing them all in the 
appropriate way, we can be more effective at preventing crises, and swifter in 
resolving them (European Union, 2012).  
 
Except of underlining the building of a diplomatic service “to meet Europe’s needs 
and the needs of the European citizens”, Catherine Ashton also stressed for the 
effectiveness and strength of small and large Member States working together on 
issues such as Iran, the Middle-East Peace Process and Syria (European Union, 
2012). Nevertheless, we should expect from a normative institutionalism 
perspective that the political rhetoric on the EEAS and EU delegations, since the 
formalization of the Lisbon Treaty, has led to some developments, even if marginal,  
in the normative foundations of coherence. In that regard we should also assume 
that Member States have started to recognize the new symbols. Accordingly, in a 
joint letter on December the 8th, 2011 the Foreign Ministers of: Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Sweden submitted a letter to the High Representative on suggestions 
for enhancing the effectiveness of the EEAS. In the joint letter the Foreign Ministers 
underlined that:  
 
“The European External Action Service (EEAS) has the potential to 
significantly enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external 
action. From the start we have strongly backed this view and have a major 
interest in a strong and efficient EEAS” (Joint Letter, 2011). 
 
Accordingly, from a normative version of institutionalism we should assume that 
Member States act in accordance with the developments of the normative 
foundation of coherence. In a report to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission, Catherine Ashton further emphasized the importance of an 
external action service to EU’s role in foreign policy and external action by 
emphasize it as an “important milestone in strengthening the EU’s institutional 
capacity”. Furthermore, as emphasized in former speeches regarding international 
security challenges Catharine Ashton argued that “the scale of challenges dictated 
as strong coherent response from the EU, and therefore need for the EEAS to play 
its full role under the Treaty” (EEAS, 2011:1). Although Catherine Ashton 
submitted a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
December the 22nd 2011, we should from a normative institutionalism perspective 
encompass its content during the 67th session. Even though the report was 
published before this session a normative argument would be that as the 66th 
session were held on October 31st 2011 and ended with one meeting on September 
the 4th 2012 (United Nations, 2013b:x), the political rhetoric in December 2011 
should rather have effects on Member States’ action at the 67th than at last meeting 
of the 66th session. 
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6.4.1 “On Behalf of the EU’ or ‘On Behalf of the EU and its Member 
States’: The Issue of Competences  
The Lisbon Treaty changed the legal structure of EU competences by making a 
distinction between three types of competences: the executive competence of the 
Union; the competence of Member States; and the shared competence of the Union 
and the Member States (Article 3-6 TFEU). The question of EU competences in 
foreign policy matters led to disputes between the Member States of the Union in 
the fall of 2011. The disagreements derived from the question of how to address 
foreign and security policies within both the Union and the Member States 
competence jurisdiction. Which in turn meant that several EU statements at 
international organizations were not delivered (EEAS, 2011:17).  
The General Secretariat of the Council submitted therefore a document to the 
EU Delegations on conclusions from a meeting on October the 22nd 2011 regarding 
general arrangements for EU statements in multilateral organizations (Council of 
the European Union, 2011). From a rational choice institutionalism perspective 
these ‘arrangements’ means new constraining structures and rules which affect the 
strategic choices available for actors, meaning what kind of issues EU can deliver 
an EU statement on. According to a rational choice version of institutionalism these 
new rules adopted by the Member States, thereby ought to enable increased vertical 
coherence by the 67th session.  
6.4.2 EU Statements at the Sixty-seventh Session 
During the 65th session the EU held statements at the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 
17th, 19th First committee meeting. The European Union held a statement on 
agenda items at the 17th meeting, without Member States stating their national 
position on the same item or meeting (United Nations, 2012b:10-179). Nonetheless, 
during the 2nd meeting Sweden held a statement on the agenda items 8 ‘General 
debate’; 102 ‘Revitalizing the work of the conference on disarmament and taking 
forward multilateral disarmament negotiations’; 90 ‘Establishment of a nuclear-
weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East’; as well as on item 94cc 
’Reducing nuclear danger’ (United Nations, 2012a; 2013b:142-143). Consequently, 
Sweden gave statements on four out of ten agenda items on which the EU held 
statements (United Nations, 2013b:50-51). Moreover, during the 9th meeting EU 
had statements on seven agenda items, from which France held statements on five 
of these: 90’Establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle 
East; 94ee’Nuclear disarmament’; 94cc’Reducing nuclear danger’; 
100’Comperhensive nuclear-test-ban treaty’; and 102’Revitalizing the work of the 
conference on disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament 
negotiations’ (United Nations, 2012b; 2013b:53-55).  
Furthermore, at the 12th meeting Latvia held national statements on agenda 
items 94t ’Implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction’ and 
on 94dd ’Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass 
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destruction’. During the same meeting Ireland, Poland and France also gave 
national statements on agenda item 94t. Nonetheless, both Ireland and the 
Netherlands expressed their national positions through statements at the 12th 
meeting on item 101’Convention on the prohibition of the conference on 
disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations’. Moreover, 
France and Ireland delivered national statements on items 94ff ‘Missiles’; and 94l 
‘The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic missiles proliferation’. 
Consequently, the national statement by France, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands 
and Poland during the 12th meeting were held on the same agenda items as the 
European Union (United Nations, 2012c; 2013b:55-122).  
Member States continued to have national statements at the 13th, 14th and 17th 
meeting, on which the EU also delivered statements on behalf of the Union. For 
instance, during the 13th meeting France held a national statement on agenda item 
92 ’Prevention of an arms race in outer space’, thereby delivering their national 
position on the agenda item as the EU statement where held on (United Nations, 
2012d; 2013b:53-55). Subsequently, at the 14th meeting France as well as the 
European Union held statements on both agenda item 94b ’Towards an Arms Trade 
Treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and 
transfer of conventional arms’ and on item 94bb ‘The illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons in all its respect’. Furthermore, at the 17th meeting the EU expressed 
the position of the whole Union through a statement on agenda item 7 ‘Work 
organization’, on which also Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden gave national statements on (United Nations, 2012e; 
2012f; 2013b;10-11, 42-59, 76, 136-143). 
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7  The Effects of Institutional Changes   
Following section compare the theoretical arguments of this research propositions, 
derived from normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism, in relation 
with the empirical findings. In doing so, we will be able to determine which 
proposition that is more likely to explain the effect of institutional changes on state 
behavior, than the other. The section starts by comparing the amount of statements 
the EU has held, during the different session meetings, without member states 
having a national statement at the same meeting and on the same agenda item. 
Accordingly, we will be able to see whether or not the vertical coherence of EU’s 
foreign policy on disarmament and matters of international security has increased 
or decreased since the establishment of the EEAS and EU delegations. Thereafter, 
I will reason about the explanatory power of the propositions.           
7.1 Increased or Decreased Vertical Coherence of 
EU’s foreign policy 
During the 53rd session of the First Committee at the United Nations General 
Assembly the coordination on actions at international organizations was set out in 
the Treat of Maastricht. At this session EU held statements on different agenda 
items at six meetings and even though Germany, Spain, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom gave national statements during these meetings neither one of them were 
on the same agenda items as the EU addressed in the statement on the position of 
the Union. At the 54th session the Treaty of Amsterdam had entered into force and 
thereby also the role of the Secretariat General and High Representative aimed at 
coordinating the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union. The EU held 
during the 54th session statements on the same amount of meetings as the previous 
session, namely on six meetings. Nonetheless, Member States gave statements on 
the same agenda item and at the same meetings as the EU. Therefore, instead of the 
vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy to increase it decreased 
in comparison with the 53rd session.  
The 63rd session of the First Committee at the United Nations General 
Assembly occurred before the formalization of the Lisbon Treaty, and thus was the 
legal structures for coordination of EU’s foreign policy at international 
organizations set out in the Treaty of Nice. Nevertheless, its structure on the 
coordination responsibilities was the same as during the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Therefore, we should start of by comparing this session with the 54th session as the 
normative version of institutionalism expects changes to develop over time. Since 
the symbolic means of the Secretariat General and High Representative was 
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introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty we should expect changes in the normative 
foundation after ten years and if so, Member States actions should have changed 
therewith. During the 63rd session in 2008 the EU held in total statements at seven 
meetings on different agenda items, whereof Member States only at one occasion 
had statements on the same agenda items as the EU and at the same meeting.  
One year after, at the 64th session the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force, 
thereby also the establishment of EU Delegations and the EEAS. At the 64th session 
the European Union gave statements, similarly to the 63rd session, during seven 
meetings on different agenda items. On the other hand, at the 64th session Member 
States held national statements on agenda items at four of the meetings where the 
Union had statements. Consequently, during the 64th session the vertical coherence 
of EU’s foreign policy decreased compared to the 63rd session, as the Member 
States increased their action in having statements on the same agenda items and at 
the same meetings as the EU. During the 65th United Nations General Assembly 
session at the First Committee the European Union held statements at seven 
meetings on different agenda items, from which Member States only held 
statements on the same agenda items at two of these meetings. Whereas the vertical 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy during the 65th session decreased in comparison 
with the 63rd session, the vertical coherence increased in comparison with the 64th 
session.  
At the 67th session of the First Committee in 2012, the EEAS was formally 
established and the General Secretariat of the Council had formulated arrangements 
for EU statements in multilateral organizations. The EU gave during the 67th 
session statements at seven meetings and on different agenda items therein. 
Nevertheless, Member States held national statements on the same agenda items as 
the Union during six of the seven meetings. Consequently, the vertical coherence 
of the EU decreased in comparison with both the 65th and 63th sessions.  
7.2 A Consequence of Symbolic or Structural Action   
In this subsection is the theoretical explanations to why institutional changes should 
have any effect on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy discussed. 
Therefore, the section begins with the proposition derived from explanations of the 
normative version of institutionalism. This is followed by the proposed proposition 
of the rational choice institutionalism. Thereafter, follows a comparison between 
them. 
7.2.1 Changing the Normative Foundation of Vertical coherence 
As regards this thesis proposed proposition derived from explanations of normative 
institutionalism we should expect changes, or at least developments, in the 
normative foundations of vertical coherence to affect state behavior by changes of 
organizational symbols and frequent political rhetoric about them. Nevertheless, 
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changes in the normative foundation of institutions occur through a long termed 
learning process. Therefore should we according to a normative version of 
institutionalism not expect the normative foundation to change shortly after the 
establishment of organizational symbols. In connection with changes in the 
normative foundation of institutions are actors’ behavior changing, as actors 
preferences are shaped by institutions. A normative institutionalism argument 
would then be that at the 54th session during which the Treaty of Amsterdam 
established the High Representative Member States would act in accordance with 
the 53rd session. Nonetheless as observed above, the Member States held more 
national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU 
delivered the statement on behalf of its Member States. Even though, a normative 
version of institutionalism emphasizes the long term perspective in order to 
determine whether reorganizations through symbolic means affect the normative 
foundation of an institution, and thereby the actors behavior, it is also recognizes 
that actors might change their behavior temporary. Consequently, actors may 
change their behavior during a limited period of time as a result of established 
reforms.  
   This assumption is also applicable to the 64th session during which the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force and thereby the symbolic establishment of EU delegations 
and the EEAS. During the 64th session Member States, compared with the 63rd 
session, held more national statements on the same agenda items and at the same 
meetings as the EU. Moreover, this assumption can be further applied to the 
increase of vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy during the 65th session, as a 
reaction on the adaptation of the EEAS by the Council. As regards why this period 
should be viewed as a temporary reaction of Member States is first and foremost 
because of the time period. From a normative version of institutionalism to short 
time between the establishment of the EEAS and its adoption by the Council for the 
reformers to affect the normative foundation of vertical coherence, and thereby 
actors’ preferences. Moreover, as the vertical coherence during the 65th session 
were similarly the 63rd session and in turn decreased at the 67th session, we can 
from a normative version of institutionalism argue that the normative foundation of 
vertical coherence had not changed nor stabilized long term effects on state 
behavior at the 65th session. 
Therefore, should these fluctuating reactions not be viewed as a result of 
changes in the normative foundation of an institution. In order to determine whether 
the reorganizations of reforms have had an effect on the normative foundation of 
institutions we should compare over time. Accordingly, by comparing the vertical 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 54th with its vertical coherence at the 63rd 
session we might be able to argue that a change in the normative foundation of 
vertical coherence has occurred as a consequence of the establishment of a High 
Representative and frequent political rhetoric thereof. The reasons for why we may 
be able to argue for a change in the normative foundation of vertical coherence is 
that the Member States have changed their behavior in terms of diminishing their 
national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU 
delivers a statement on the position of the Union and its Member States.  
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In that regard, from the normative proposition presented in this research we 
should expect that the political rhetoric on the establishment of EU delegations and 
the EEAS since 2009 has at least resulted in developments of the normative 
foundation of vertical coherence by 2013 and thereby actions preferences. 
Accordingly, we should expect developments of Member States’ action and the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First Committee’s 67th session. 
The figure below illustrates delivered statements by the EU and Member States at 
the sessions, studied in this thesis, at the First Committee over time. Moreover the 
blue graph8 illustrates the number of national statements delivered by the Member 
States of the EU at session meetings. While the gray graph represent the number of 
statements delivered by the EU at session meetings, the orange graph constitutes 
this thesis definition of vertical coherence, namely the number of EU statements 
delivered at session meetings in which Member States  has not held a national 
statement on the same agenda item as the Union.  
 
(United Nations, 2010b:9-126; 2011b: 8-149; United Nations, 2012b: 8-164; 2014b:10-179). 
 
As illustrated by the orange graph in the figure, the vertical coherence of EU’s 
foreign policy has decreased between the 63rd and the 67th session. The decrease 
of the vertical coherence as a result of changing organizational symbols on 
coordination of EU’s foreign policy is in accordance to a normative version of 
institutionalism not unexpected, as result of shifting symbols of organizations and 
political rhetoric thereto do not always lead to the expected result. Nonetheless, we 
are not able from the time period between the 63rd and 67th session to draw the 
conclusion of a normative institutionalism perspective that changing organizational 
symbols by the Lisbon Treaty have per se decreased the vertical coherence of EU’s 
foreign policy. This because the study between the 53rd and the 63rd session shows 
an increased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, by 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 For further information on which Member States who held national statements at the session meetings see 
Annex 1. 
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underlining the normative version of institutional change we should emphasize that 
changes in the normative foundation of an institution affect the behavior of actors. 
Therefore, by looking as the blue graph which illustrates Member States national 
statements between the 63rd and the 67th session we can thus also see a changed 
behavior in time. Accordingly, by the graph we can see that Member States’ 
national statements increased over the same time period as Member States increased 
their national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the 
EU. Accordingly, we should from a normative institutionalism perspective on the 
effect of institutional change be able to argue that a development in the normative 
foundation of vertical coherence has occurred since the reorganizational shifts of 
symbolic means for coordination of EU’s foreign policy.  
7.2.2 Changing Structure on Coordination of EU’s Foreign Policy 
  
This thesis proposition derived from explanations of rational choice institutionalism 
proposed that changes in the hierarchical structure on coordination, by centralized 
responsibilities for coordination decreased available strategic choices, and 
increased information sharing, affect states behavior and thereby the collective 
outcome. Therefore from a rational choice perspective on institutional change we 
should expect both the creation of the role of High Representative with the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the establishment of a European external action service as 
well as EU delegations with the Lisbon Treaty to increase the vertical coherence of 
EU’s foreign policy. Furthermore, the assumption that we should assume that states 
behave in accordance with the new structures and rules on coordination of EU’s 
foreign policy is based on the definition of institutions as contributing with short-
termed constrains on the behavior of actors. Nonetheless, during the session after 
the establishment of the High Representative with the Treaty of Amsterdam the 
vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy decreased compared to the 53rd session. 
In other words, instead of decreasing the number of national statements on the same 
agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU held a statement during the 54th 
session, the Member States expressed to a greater extent than before their national 
position when EU stated the position of the Union. 
    Accordingly, compared with the 63rd session, during the 64th session the vertical 
coherence of EU’s foreign policy decreased after the establishment of EU 
delegations and the EEAS with the Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, the EU 
established an administrative body aiming at increasing the exchange of 
information and preparing positions at international organizations, which should be 
expected to affect actors’ available choices and preferences and thereby lead to 
collective beneficial outcomes. Nonetheless, instead of coordinating positions 
Member States rather increased their national statements at different meetings 
during the 64th session. In line with a rational choice version of institutionalism we 
should have expected to see an increase, at least a stable, amount of collective 
actions. As such one might argue that the normative version of institutionalism has 
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greater explanatory power as to why institutional changes should affect state 
behavior than rational choice institutionalism.  
However, this further raises the question of how we according to rational choice 
version of institutionalism rather explain decreased instead of their focus on 
increased collective outcomes. In doing so, we can argue that only because 
structures and rules on coordination have changed in order to enable increased 
exchange of information does not mean that actors adopt to this new structure of 
coordination shortly after its establishment. As assumed by a rational choice version 
of institutionalism institutions change because actors ‘demand’ an increased 
‘supply’. However by continuing on this argument by scholars of rational choice 
institutionalism we should therefore assume that when supply increases the demand 
do not necessarily immediately follow. Consequently, we should rather expect an 
increase in the vertical coherence of EU at the 65th session and not in the 64th 
session.  
At the 65th session the EU held statements once again during seven meetings 
and in comparison with the 64th session Member States national statements at the 
same meetings and on the same agenda items as the EU decreased. Accordingly, 
the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy increased. Therefore, 
by addressing the assumption that the actors needs some time to adjust to the fact 
that structures and rules of coordination on the Union’s foreign policy has changed 
and increased. In that regard, a centralized administrative body for increased 
coordination of national interest and with authority to prepare proposals should 
affect the Member States’ strategies and preferences, thereby increase the vertical 
coherence. In accordance with the assumption that actors need time to adjust to 
structural and rule changes we should as a result of the Council decision on the 
EEAS in 2012 expect the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy to decrease 
during the 67th sessions. Accordingly, during the 67th session the number of 
meetings during which statements by the EU on certain agenda items not addressed 
by the Member States national statements decreased, meaning that Member States 
had more often statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items at 
the Union, compared with the 65th session. This argument can than also be applied 
to the decreased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 54th session 
compared to the 53rd session. 
Accordingly, the argument that the rational choice version of institutionalism 
needs to give actors time to recognizes the ‘supply’, meaning centralized 
coordination responsibilities and increased information sharing, and thereby to be 
affected by the institutional constrains enable to some extent to encompass 
decreases of collective outcomes. Nonetheless, the supply-demand reasoning from 
a rational choice version of institutionalism does not deal with the question of why 
the Member States have between the 63rd and the 67th session increased expressed 
their national position through national statements at the meetings. Nonetheless, a 
rational choice version of institutions emphasizes that actors are constrained by 
rules and structures of institutions upon which they act. Therefore should we 
assume that Member States also acts upon national structures and rules of 
institutions which in turn contain them. Accordingly it is not a matter of which rules 
and structures that constrain an actor more than the other, rather as states are 
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strategic calculators they need to assess the strategies in accordance which more 
than one institution.  
In that regard, we can argue from a rational choice version of institutionalism 
that the Member States of the EU have to calculate their strategies in accordance 
with two institutions, which in turn are assessed against each other and thereby 
determines the collective outcome. In other words, the effects of changed 
institutions on state behavior is that they can be forced to assess the institutions 
against each other which in turn may lead to collective beneficial outcomes 
depending on which institutional rules and strategic states calculates on. 
Accordingly, after the changes in the hierarchical structure of coordination 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaties, Member States calculated their action both in 
relation with the national coordination structure and the coordination structure of 
the EU which affected the policy outcome by decreasing the vertical coherence of 
EU’s foreign policy in international organizations.       
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8 Conclusion 
The research question that this thesis aimed to explain was why would institutional 
changes affect the vertical coherence of European Union’s foreign policy, 
especially in international organizations such as the UN? In order to answer the 
research question of this study two possible propositions were derived from 
normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism on why institutional 
changes would have any effect on state behavior, and thereby the policy outcome. 
In accordance with the proposition derived from a normative version of 
institutionalism, namely: changes in the normative foundation of institution, we 
should expect institutional changes to affect the behavior of states provided that the 
reform or reorganization in question shifted the symbolic meaning of an 
organization and that reformers conducted a political rhetoric on the expectations 
of that shift. Moreover, the proposed proposition derived from rational choice 
institutionalism   assumed that changes in the hierarchical structure on coordination, 
by centralizing responsibilities of coordination, increasing information sharing and 
decreasing available strategic choices, would affect the state behavior and the 
collective beneficial outcome. Furthermore, the normative and rational choice 
versions of institutionalism define institutions differently, thereby simultaneously 
underlining different aspects of reforms as important. On the one hand, the 
normative version of institutional changes emphasized shifts of symbolic 
coordination means, such as the creation of a High Representative with the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the shift to EU delegations as well as the establishment of 
EEAS with the Lisbon Treaty. On the other hand, the rational choice version of 
institutionalism emphasizes changes in terms of formal structures and rules on 
coordination.  
The propositions from normative and rational choice institutionalism were 
compared over a time period of 1998-2013 to the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign 
policy at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The 
proposition derived from the normative institutionalism: on the change of 
institutions’ normative foundation, had greater explanatory power on why 
institutional changes would affect the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in 
international organization. While the proposition from the normative version of 
institutionalism emphasized both increases and decreases of the vertical coherence, 
the rational choice version of institutionalism was only able to explain the increases. 
Nonetheless, by including a rational choice institutionalism reasoning on supply 
and demand as well as states interaction with more than one institution, we were 
able to also assess the decreases of vertical coherence from a rational choice version 
of institutionalism. 
Even though the normative  explanatory power of the propositions are compared 
with each other they are also to be viewed as complementary in the sense that their 
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findings complement each other and thereby enable an explanation as to why 
institutional changes effect the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in 
international organizations. The vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 
First Committee decreased in 1999 during the 54th session and in 2008 at the 64th 
session. This occurred as a reaction to the symbolic shift on coordination 
responsibilities of the European Union’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, at the 63rd 
session the symbol of a High Representative changed the normative foundation of 
vertical coherence, thereby the state behavior, and its mandate to increase 
information sharing and preparing positions enabled strategic states to calculations: 
which lead to increased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy. Furthermore, 
frequent rhetoric on the expectations with the symbolic shifts of EU delegations and 
the creation of EEAS have developed the normative foundation of vertical 
coherence and thereby the state behavior. This has led Member States, who are 
constrained by rules and structures at both national level and the EU level, to 
strategically comply with rules and structures at the national level. One could 
therefore argue that the institutional changes on coordination so far have led to 
decreased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly. Consequently, by viewing the findings of the 
competing theories as complementary one might argue in more general terms that 
the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has between 2008-2013 decreased as 
the hierarchical structures of coordination on the European Union’s has changed 
and as the normative foundation of vertical coherence has developed.  
8.1 Further Research  
Further research needs to be conducted both regarding the theoretical as well as the 
empirical findings. In connection with the latter, further theoretical studies on the 
effects of institutional changes on state behavior according to the normative and 
rational choice versions of institutionalism need to be conducted and to develop 
their scope on institutional change as an explanatory variable. As regards the latter, 
further empirical studies needs to be done in the future in order to assess whether 
the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy increases in the long term. 
Nonetheless, empirical studies going further back than the Amsterdam Treaty 
should also be carried out in order to strengthen the findings in this thesis. 
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Annex 1 
First Committee meetings during the 
63th UNGA session 
EU MS 
1 -   
2 X  
3 -   
4  -  
5  -  
6 -   
7 -   
8 X  
9 -  AT 
10 -  UK 
11 X HU; LT 
12 X DK; PL 
13 -  AT; FI 
14 -  LT; SE; UK 
15 -   DE; IE; NL 
16 X  
17 -  MT; NL 
18 -   
19 -  FI; LT 
20 X BE; IT; NL 
21 X  
22 -  FI; NL; UK 
(United Nations, 2011b: 
 
First Committee meetings during the 
64th UNGA session: 
EU MS 
1 -  - 
2 -  SE 
3 -  BG 
4 -  -  
5 -  -  
6 -  -   
7 -   - 
8 -   - 
9 X  
10 -  NL; UK; FR 
11 -  AT; 
12 X HU; PL 
13 X  
14  - IE; SE; UK; FI; SK 
15 -  NL; RO; SI; FR 
16  - NL; UK; AT 
17  - MT 
18 X AT 
19 X ES; UK; FR 
20 -  UK; FR; AT 
21 -  SE; FR 
22 X IE; PT; UK; DE 
23 X NL; UK; DE; AT 
24 -  SK 
(United Nations, 2011b: 8-149). 
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First Committee meetings during 
the 65th UNGA session: 
EU MS 
1 -   
2 X  
3 -  FR 
4 -   
5 -   
6 -  DE 
7 -   
8 -  DK 
9 X  
10 -  IT; NL; UK 
11 -  AT; FR; IE 
12 X AT IT; NL 
13 X FI; FR; SI; UK 
14 -  LV; NL; SI; UK 
15 -  DE; SI 
16 -   
17 X MT 
18 X HU; NL; PL 
19 X FR; IE; IT; SI 
20 -  FR; DE; ES; UK 
21 -  BE; FR; DE; NL; UK 
22 -  FR; DE; IT; SI; ES 
23 -  BE; FR; SI 
24 -  FI 
(United Nations, 2012b: 8-164). 
 
First Committee meetings during 
the 67th UNGA session 
EU MS 
1 -   
 -   
2 X SE 
3 -   
4  - AT; ES 
5  - FR; UK; PT 
6 -  HU; 
7 -  DK 
8 -  IE; 
9 X FR 
10 -  LT; UK; NL; RO 
11 -  IE; AT 
12 X IE; LV; FR; NL; PL 
13 X HU; FR; ES 
14 X FR 
15 -   EL; LT; NL 
16 -  HU; UK; SE 
17 X IE; AT; DK; FI; FR; DE; PT; SK; 
SI; ES 
18 -  IE; LT; ET; FR; DE; UK; NL; SK; 
ES 
19 X  
20 -  BE; FR; DE; UK; NL; ES 
21 -  BE; DE; UK; NL; SK; SE 
22 -  IT; FR; DE; UK; NL; ES; SE 
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(United Nations, 2014b:10-179). 
